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ABSTRACT
The thesis describes experiments carried out with children and
squirrel monkeys designed to challenge the claim by Bryant and Trabasso
(1971) that children as young as four can make genuine transitive inferences.
Bryant and Trabasso demonstrated their claim using a five-term modification
of classical transitivity tasks (e.g. A>B; B >C; A?C). Several experi¬
mental variations of the design of their five-term problem are reported,
involving verbal and non-verbal conditions. The results of these experi¬
ments show that the transitive choice profile which obtains under speci¬
fiable conditions of training and test is attributable to psychological
mechanisms which do not necessarily implicate deductive operations.
Instead, the results are interpreted as support for James's (1891)
distinction between "reasoning distinctively" and thought based on
"associative sequence". Contrary to Bryant and Trabasso's claim, it is
concluded that the solution of the five-term transitivity problem by
young children is based on "empirical thinking" which in James's terms
is "reproductive" rather than "productive".
CHAPTER ONE
When does the ohild reach the age of reason? At what stage in
his development is he considered capable of logical thought? Tradition
both ecclesiastical and civil would suggest that it is not until the
age of seven and beyond that the child can be considered truly rational.
This view has been confirmed in the laboratory by Piaget and his co¬
workers (1928, 1952, 1953* 1956 and 1964). Following the use of the
"clinical method" where the child's errors on standard "intelligence"
tests were followed up in an attempt to identify the causal factors
at work in producing them (errors are assumed to be largely determined
by the structure of "thought" and are not the random result of
"ignorance" or "mistake"), Piaget concludes;
"It is no exaggeration to say that there is no logical
reasoning before the age of 7 - 8." (1928 p 234).
"About the age of seven, a fundamental turning point
is noted in the child's development. He becomes capable
of a certain logic." (1974 P 20).
For Piaget, then, reasoning is a major feature of intellectual
growth and its appearance at seven marks only the beginning of logical
development but not its summit. At the first "logical" stage - the
stage of Concrete Operations between seven and eleven years of age -
the child's "logic" is vexy much tied to a given ooncrete situation.
For example, a child at this stage is able to rearrange a random array
of differently sized sticks into an ordered series. However, he seems
to be unable to seriate information presented to him in more abstract
and general terms, i.e. when the information is presented linguisti¬
cally. It is only at around the age of eleven to twelve (the beginning
of the Formal Operational stage) that a child is capable of reasoning,
by oo-ordinating propoaitional statements and thereby creating an
ordered Beries. Perhaps Piaget's best known illustration of this is
the test adapted from Burt (1919)» in which a child is given the
following information: "Edith is fairer than Suzannej Edith is darker
than Lili". He is then asked "Which is the darkest (fairest), Edith,
Suzanne or Lili?". Children under twelve years of age do not solve
this problem correctly and normally conclude that Suzanne is the
fairest and Lili the darkest.
Piaget believes that such difficulties encountered by children
originate in their lack of understanding of the "relativity of ideas"
(1928^ 87). While relations may be easily peroeived (19^4* PP 5 and
10) they do not appear to have "psychological existence". That is,
relations are not fully grasped as relations, and they do not carry
for the child their logical implication, e.g. "Paul is my brother" does
not imply "I am Paul's brother" (I928^p 87). More specifically, Piaget
believes that relations are aotually converted into judgments of
membership. For example, he describes the child's response to the
"Edith, Lili and Suzanne" problem in the following way:
"Instead of tackling the matter by judgments of
relation, i.e. ty making use of such expressions as
"Fairer than" etc., the child deals simply in judgments
of membership, and tries to find out with regard to the
three girls whether they are fair or dark (speaking
absolutely). It is exactly as though he reasoned as
follows: Edith is fairer than Suzanne, so they are both
fair; Edith is darker than Lili, so they are both dark;
therefore Lili is dark, Suzanne is fair and Edith is
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between the two." (1928, p 87).
He concludes that Judgments of relation are "substituted by Judgments
of membership".
The three-term series used by Piaget and Burt was later adapted
by other Investigators. Tests of transitive reasoning, as they are
sometimes known, fall roughly into two categories.
a) The verbal versions similar to the 'Edith, Suzanne and Lili*
problem. These are studied largely in oonneotion with the
development of formal operations and the processes of adult
reasoning (Hunter, 1957} de Soto et al, 1965} Huttenlocher,
1968, a, b, oj Clark, 1969, a, b; Johnson-Laird, 1972}
Trabasso et al, 1975* a, b, o).
b) Concrete versions of the problem using, e.g. visible size differ¬
ences between sticks (Smedslund, 1963» 1965} Braine, 1964}
Glick and Wapner, 1968; Youniss et al, 1968, 1970)*
These studies have progressively unearthed more and more of the
factors which are seen to play a role either in the achievement of a
solution, or in the failure to solve the problem. For example, "Judgment
of membership" was included in only one of two sets of factors which
were isolated by Hunter (1957)+ as likely to affect the strategy used
in solving the three-term series. He studied the relative difficulty
encountered by 64 eleven-year-olds and 32 sixteen-year-olds when
presented with eight different problem "structures" and using three
+ The problem had been studied by this time in the context of four-
and five-term series (Pinard, Barbeau, Laurendeau and Parant,
1954). Hunter considered the three-term version to make "for
easier experimental investigation of at least some of those
psychological processes which would seem to be fundamental to the
solving of axy type of series problem".
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kinds of comparative terms, i.e. taller/shorter, warmer/colder, and
happier/sadder. These are depicted below:
Direotion in which
Problem Structure No. AC question is asked
*1 A > B •• B > C > ?
Z2 A > B : B > C < ?
A > B «• C £ B > ?
ni A > B : C < B < ?
in.
1
B < A : C £ B > ?
m2 B 4 A •• C < B 4 ?
IV1 B 4 A ♦• B > C > ?
CM
ft B < A •§ B > C < ?
Hunter believes that these structures are differentially susceptible
to the following factors:
a) Atmosphere effects
An anecdotal example of an "atmosphere effeot" (recorded prior
to the decimalisation of the British monetary system) can be shown by
the following "trick" played on a gullible bus passenger:
Conductor: "l/5d please"
Passenger gives him 2/~
Conductor: "Got a penny?"
Passenger gives him 1d
Conductor gives Passenger 6d change.
Atmosphere effects "predispose the thinker to aocept that particular
answer whioh 'looks right' although it may or may not be correct"
(Hunter, 1957, p 289). One such effeot is oalled by Hunter the effeot
of "direct statement", e.g. where the form of the question echoes the
form of one of the premises and makes it more likely to determine the
answer. On thie basis, problem type IX as illustrated above would be
solved corrootly, whilst problem type IV would be solved incorreotly.
The other effect of atmosphere is Plaget'a "judgment of membership",
called by Banter, "ineiusiveness". This effect would also favour a
correct answer on problem type II hut an incorrect answer on problem
type IV, Atmosphere effects occur, in short, when a subject is willing
to solve the problem on the basis of a "global impression" or "feel",
b) Structural effects
These, by contrast, operate when the subject appears to make a
"sequence of analytical judgments of relation and identity between
successively encountered terms". The method of solution in this case
involves constructing an isotropic series. An isotropio series is
defined by Hunter as follows:
"Two linked premises are isotropio when aaoh oontains
the same unreversed relation and also when the common term
is the referee of the first-encountered premise and the
referent of the seoond premise, e.g.A>B:B>C and
C < B : B < A. When the relation of one linked premise
is the reverse of that contained in the other, then these
premises are heterotropic. e.g. A > B : C < B."
Using James* "Axiom of Skipped Intermediaries" (1891) as collateral,
Hunter assumes that the subject must derive an isotropio series before
solving the problem, i.e. he oust have some serial representation of
the items described (relationally) in the linked premises. Thus, in
the oase of a heterotropic series, "the thinker must make them
isotropic by reorganising one or other of the premises" (Hunter, 1957).
Reorganising falls into two distinct categories: converting (required
by structure II, i.e. A > B : C < B becomes A > B : B< C) and re¬
ordering (required by structure III, i.e. B A : C< B becomes
CCB:B<A). A third category includes two permutations of these
first two. The first is converting-reordering (required "by problem IV,
i.e. B < A : B > C becomes C < B : B < A). The second (also required
(as an alternative) by problem IV) is reversing-converting (i.e. back¬
tracking to the first premise and converting it: i.e. B<A:B>C
becomes A> B : B >C).
In his stuty, ffcmter looked at the relationship between the
structural complexity of the task and its difficulty.+ Using solution
time as a measure, he found that sixteen-year-olds were more sensitive
to structural effects than eleven-year-oldsj the younger subjects were
more susceptible, however, to "atmosphere" effects. Of the difficulties
experienced by younger children, some were identified as related to the
structural characteristics of the problem but these were, in Hunter*s
terms, more "blurred". Younger children also experienced greater
difficulty with the more "abstract" relations happier/sadder possibly
because, as Trabasso, Riley and Wilson (1975) point out, they do not
have "direct dimensional reference to physical objects". Overall,
Hunter concluded that "increasing age brings increasing appreciation
of the structural characteristics of series as such, together with an
increasing skill in dealing with serial relations which are progress¬
ively more remote from the perceptual-motor level of behaviour" (p 286).
A similar attempt was made concerning grammatical and psychological
complexity (Brown, 1973)*
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After Hunter, interest grew concerning the mechanisms of
re-organising used by adults when attempting to solve the three-term
series. Two major models of adult reasoning were put forward. One
(de Soto, London and Handel, 1965, and Ifiattenlooher, 1S68, a, b, 0)
developed the idea that the linear (isotropic) presentation was
achieved by means of an imaginal spatial layout (either vertical or
horizontal). These authors propose that the first premise is entered
by "end-anchoring", i.e. the first term of the first premise is placed
at the top (left)-most or bottom (right)-most position in the array
(depending on the direction of the relation specified in that premise).
The second premise is then entered (if neoessary, after conversion)
so that it continues in a direction consistent with the first premise.
Thus, an isotropic series would be predicted as easier to construct
if the first item of the first premise is also the first item of the
series. If this is not the case, then a subject must proceed from the
middle to the end of the series - a condition on whioh de Soto et
al's subjects showed less than 50 correot performance. However,
Huttenlocher (1968, a) has suggested that the most significant faotor
in "end-anchoring" (where different from the actual order of the
premises) i3 the subject's perception of the "deep-structure" of the
series, i.e. the subject/object relations within it. This conclusion
is based on studies (1968, b, c) in whioh ohildren, when asked to use
real objects to "fit" the description, e.g. "the blue block is on top
of the brown block", found the task easier if the object to be mani¬
pulated corresponded to the subject rather than the object of the
sentence.
Ey contrast with the imagery models in which the answer may be
<* 8 «•
"read off" from a spatial layout, Clark (19^9 a, b) has put forward a
"linguistic" model of reasoning in which the answer is thought to be
aohieved by operations performed on the words themselves. For example,
to take the problem A>B:B>C:AC?, Clark presumes that the first
premise, verbalised as "A is bigger than B", is converted into "A is
more big and B is less big", and likewise with the second premise.
The item stored twice, i.e. B, is then reclassified as "middle", "more"
is reclassified as "most", and "less" as "least". The ultimate re¬
presentation is thus: "A is most big, B is middle and C is least big".
However, if the second premise were to be expressed as C < B or "C is
smaller than B", then it would be stored as "C is more amall and B is
less small", and the final representation in this case would be: "A
is most big, B is middle and C is most small". As Clark (1969 a ,
has suggested that the "marked" or negative pole of an antonymous
pair requires more operations of definition than the unmarked or
positive term, it can be seen that his model relates to difficulties
subjeots may have with the linguistic structure of the premises. As
Johnson-Laird (1972) points out, "the representations involving .....
any marked item will be more complex than those involving any
unmarked item".
Thus it oan be seen that, in general, models of adult and
adolesoent reasoning have been concerned with strategies of informa¬
tion reorganising used by subjects to achieve a logical solution.
Investigations of child reasoning, on the other hand, have been aimed
primarily at establishing the minimum age at which logical solutions
can be said to occur at all. In this context several findings have
been reported which appear to contradict Piaget's claim that the child
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is not in possession of logical operations before the age of seven.
One such study was that carried out by Braine (1959)• In Braine * s
study, children were trained to find candy under the longer of two
stioks. They were then shown two imperceptibly different sticks, A
and C, and shown in addition that a middle stick B was shorter than A
and longer than C (when placed against them in turn). Braine found
that 50% of children between the ages of 4.2 and 5.5 correctly con¬
cluded that the candy was under A. These results were interpreted by
Braine as a demonstration of transitive reasoning. In making several
criticisms of this experiment, Smedslund (1963* 19^5) raised the poss¬
ibility that seeing A as "longer" may lead straight away to the judgment
that the candy was underneath it without taking B and C into acoount.
Criticisms such as this one led to the adoption of a procedure which
Youniss and Murray (1970) later described as the "conventional" one.
The basic steps in this procedure are:
a) a child views/judges a stick A to be longer than stick B on
trial 1;
b) he views stick B to be longer than stick C on trial 2j and
0) he is asked to judge stick A and C when presented sane distance
apart and differing indiscriminably in length. Subjects who
judge, apparently without benefit of direct perceptual informa¬
tion, that A is longer than C are regarded as having demonstrated
reasoning ability.
Even this procedure, however, was seen by Youniss and Murray to
be susceptible to a criticism similar to the atmosphere effect in
language problems - that Stick A is judged to be "longer" and may
retain that label regardless of subsequent comparisons. Youniss and
- 10 -
Murray's own experiment (1970) controlled for this by apparently using
a five-item series although they did not describe it as such. To
remove the atmosphere or labelling effect they introduced terms X and
Y to the (stick) series ABC. Three paradigms were used. In the first,
X was shown to be bigger than A, Y to be smaller than C, A to be bigger
than B and B to be bigger than C. In the second, X and A were equal
and B and C were equal, and in the third Y and C were equal, and A and
B were equal. In all three tests ohildren were asked to judge (finally)
A versus C. Essentially therefore these paradigms consisted of the
presentation of a five-term heterotropic series, e.g. A) B ! D I
B > C : C } D. The criteria for success employed by Youniss and Murray
were:
(i) Subjects were required to succeed on all three paradigms.
(ii) They were required to succeed on a test of seriation (considered
by Piaget to be collateral to transitive reasoning).
Using these criteria, six-year-olds failed to behave "inferentially"
and eight-year-olds performed only "with moderate success". Only 31%
of the eight-year-olds sucoeeded on all three paradigms. Success on
the seriation test was found to be predictive of better transitivity
performance in the six-year-olds but could not be evaluated statist¬
ically for eight-year-olds as only three out of 32 failed on this test.
An additional finding suggested that the order in which the information
was presented oould affect the response, i.e. AB, ED, BC, CD was more
likely to produce a correct BD result than BC, CD, AB, ED. Youniss
and Murray pointed out that "inferential judgments were still open to
situational determinants" and concluded that eight years was a
'"threshold* age level and not an age at which a transitive inference
was a highly stable operation".
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However, several investigators have suggested that a failure to
produce a transitive response does not necessarily imply a lack of
logical ability. In this vein, Bryant (1973b) has pointed out that no
study carried out before 1971 took precautions that:
a) subjects oould actually remember the premises at the time of
test, and
b) results when "positive" were exempt from the "labelling"
criticisms.
In order to incorporate these controls in a single experiment,
Biyant and Trabasso (1971) devised a five-term version of the problem
in which subjects were trained to remember four premises, A > B; B > C;
C > Dj D > 1 of a five-term stick series A > B > C >D > E, They trained
60 subjeots at three age levels - four, five and six years - and ensured
that their retention of the training pairs was very good at the time of
test. The terms in the series were denoted by the colour of the sticks,
e.g. A - red, B - blue, C - yellow, B - green, E - black. The sticks
were presented two at a time sunk into a wooden box so that equal
portions of the sticks were visible. Subjects were asked "Whioh is
taller?" or "Which is shorter?" and were given feedback. In Experiment 1,
this was done by showing subjeots the relative heights of stioks after
evezy response and saying, e.g. "Yes, that's right, red is taller than
blue". However, this was considered by the authors to be open to the
critioism that subjects could remember the actual (absolute) sises of
the stioks, rather than the relational information they required for
a transitive inference. In a second experiment reported in their paper,
therefore, only the verbal feedbaok was given. The pairs were learned
separately to a criterion of eight out of 10 correct on each pair,
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given in order from AB to DE (Phase I). They were then given "runs"
of the four pairs, presented once each in random order, until they
achieved a criterion of six out of six successive oorrect on each pair.
Subjects were then given test pairs AC, AD, AE, BD, BE and CE along
with the training pairs all presented in random order four times each
and without feedback. All children showed significant transitive
choice biases on BD. The probability of a transitive ohoice on BD in
Experiment 2 was .82 for four-year-olds and .85 for five-year-olds.
(No six-year-olds were run on this experiment.) The performance on
BD was in faot lower than all the other test pairs. However, the
retention performance on BC and CD was lower than on AB and DE and
Bryant and Trabasso used this to argue that the lower performance on
the crucial BD pairs is: " due to a failure of retention of the
information oontained in the initial comparisons". They demonstrated
that the probability of a transitive bias on BD is fairly well pre¬
dicted for their scores, by the joint probabilities of a correct
response on BC and CD, i.e. Pgp = PB£, x P^.
From results such as these, Bryant and Trabasso olaim that "very
young children are able to make transitive inferences extremely effect¬
ively. They oan combine separate quantity judgments very well and they
can do so at a far younger age than has generally been assumed." These
investigators thus implicate only a single factor as crucial to the
result. They suggest that in reasoning tasks, "an error might simply
be due to a failure in memory and have nothing to do with inferential
ability". Thus they claim "one must ensure that the child has retained
the comparisons which he has to combine, if one is to infer whether or
not he can make transitive inferences".
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This claim provoked controversy (see Youniss and Furth, 1973)
mainly over three points:
a) that they did not manipulate the memory variable;
b) that the children's solutions may have been "sub-logical"; and
c) that memory failure cannot be implicated as a factor in Piaget's
(i960) demonstration of failure to reason transitively.+
Bryant (1973a) replied to this challenge by pointing out
a) that he had (subsequently) manipulated the memory variable and
on a "trial by trial analysis of what the child remembered and
of his ability to reach the correct inference" he apparently
oonfirmed that there was a direct relation between the two (in
Hinde and Hinde, 1973)J
b) that Youniss and Purth had not themselves suggested a "sub-
logioal" explanation which would serve as an alternative to his
own (Youniss and Furth, in fact, referred to Huttenlocher's
spatial imagery model which Bryant described as perfectly
compatible with a logical strategy); and
c) that Youniss and Furth had overlooked certain of Piaget's other
non "spontaneous" experiments (1941, 1969a, 1969b, 1970) in which
information subjects were required to combine was not apparently
+
The studies they referred to were "measurement" taskB (Piaget,
Inhelder and Sseminska, 1960) where subjects were considered to
show transitive reasoning if they spontaneously used a middle
term to judge the relative heights of two towers which were
placed at different levels (and could not be judged directly).
As this was an "active" task where the subject was not simply
the recipient of certain information, Youniss and Furth argued
that memory failure could hardly be a significant factor.
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rehearsed nor were any steps taken to ensure that they could
remember it.+
Thus, Bryant and Trabasso'a experiment appears to be the first
demonstration of transitive reasoning by young ohildren in which pre¬
cautions were taken to ensure that the child could remember the
information given and that end-point labelling did not contribute -
at least directly - to the crucial test results. If substantiated,
their finding has major implications for developmental theories such
as Piaget's, not the least of which would require a switch from the
study of thinking to the study of memory per se as the significant
developmental variable.
Convincing as Bryant and Trabasso's results are - at least at
first blush - there remains a considerable burden of proof that the
young child*s choices in such tests are actually based on logical
operations. Such operations, however, must be inferred from the ohoioe
data as, to quote lutkus and Trabaaao (1974-) "They (Bryant and
Trabaaso) did not make us© of the normal Piagetian criterion of verbal
explanation to asaert that a transitive inference had occurred. Kather
they designed their experiment in such a way that success on the BD
On this last point neither set of investigators makes it clear,
nor even seems to be aware, that Piaget (1928) has already taken
pains to ensure that subjeots could remember the information
they were given i
"Once the child has read the test often enough, once
he has it sufficiently engraved upon his mind and
difficulties of attention no longer exist, the logical
diffioulty still subsists of understanding how a little
girl oan be at the same time fairer than a second and
darker than a third." (p 111).
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pair, (the "symptom response") (to use Smedslund's term) could be
explained in no other way than by a transitive inference." But is
this the case? The work which is reported in this thesis represents
a direct challenge to this position.
CHAPTER TWO
The hallmark of abstract, reflective thought is freedom from
the spatio-temporal character of events as these are peroeived and
sensed directly. Cognitive "structure" is not, thus, a direct
reflection of (any) order endemic to a well behaved environmental
layout (Gibson, 1966) but is a construction of the organism's, per¬
mitting an internal representation of hypothetical as well as actual
events and relationships. As Piaget (1971) puts it, "the whole of
logic consists in establishing invariant schemata aimed at organizing
into thought form the irreversible stream of external happenings"
(p 151)« Such freedom from stimulus oontrol is gained, as Bruner
(1966) puts it "..... through mediating processes ..... that transform
the stimulus prior to response. ..... A theory of growth that does
not attempt an account of these mediating processes and of the nature
of the transformations they make possible is not very interesting
psychology." (p 5). One such account of these processes has recently
been provided by Trabasso (1975)» based on information-processing
theory approaches where the internal representation is
"...., a symbolic entity containing elements that are
related to one another in some defined way, which is
constructed by the person in response to task demands
and stored in memory for related purposes. This
representation is constructed by processing stimuli
and can be used to construct other representations,
access descriptive information and retrieve properties
of elements in response to inferential questions."
(Trabasso, Riley and Wilson, 1975)
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In common with logioal (Hunter, 1957) and imagery (de Soto et
al, 1965, and Huttenlooher, 1968) models, the representation achieved
by the problem solver is seen to be of a linear order type, constructed
as a result of the integration of relational information into an
ordered set and subsequently allowing an internal "read off" of the
relative position of the items thus stored. At the time of test,
therefore, no co-ordination of the premises is required of the subjeot.
The crucial integrative prooesses are considered to occur during the
training phase of the problem. Evidence on the linear aspect of
representation is considered by Trabasso to centre on two points:
a) A serial position effect is observed in the training data.
This is regarded by Trabasso as "prima facie" evidence for
an underlying linear order oode.
b) During transitive tests the reaction times for non-adjacent
items in the series are generally lower than the reaction
times for adjacent items. This result is interpreted by
Trabasso etal(l 975) as indicating that "subjects did not
engage in deductive reasoning at the time of test in order
to make comparative length inferences". Instead the
greater the psychological distance for the various items
on a linear scale, the faster will be the choice time.
But what of the evidence that integration involving oo-ordination
of pairs occurs at all? Might the essentially serial nature of the
training task leading to the learning of what is essentially an iso¬
tropic series not lead to some simple form of representation which
permits at least one alternative strategy to co-ordination of premises
either during training or at the time of test? The first experiment
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reported here is addressed to this question. The seoond experiment
extends the enquiry along these lines through the provision of
genuine heterotropie series requiring transformation by subjects if
a correct solution is to be achieved.
EXPERIMENT 1
RATIONALE
The five term series as used by Bryant and. Trabasso (i971) may be
considered an example of a serial learning task. Certainly serial
learning effects are apparent in their retention data. (Retention
scores show a bow-shaped profile with the middle pairs emerging as
the more difficult ones). In the initial training phase the pairs
are trained in on order isomorphic with the (isotropic) form consid¬
ered by mary investigators as the psychologically necessary order
which the subject must first achieve before any genuine (transitive)
solution can be reached. The fact that a random phase follows on
from this should not obscure the point that strong primacy over
recency effects could well ensure a form of representation of the
series by subjects, which requires no transformation of order whatso¬
ever. In short, a much simpler strategy based on serial "mapping"
may be made possible by Bryant and Trabasso's "serial" training phase.
If this were the case, however, it might be expected that the random
phase produces a decrement in training performance which would be
reflected in the retention and "inference" test scores (assuming, for
the time being, a direct relationship between retention and the test
performance on non-adjacent pairs). Some evidence for this certainly
exists in Bryant and Trabasso's data. Firstly they suggest that some
special difficulty attaches to the random phase - particularly in the
case of the youngest group:
"All groups learned the initial (direct) comparisons
rapidly. In the first phase of training there seemed to
be no age differences in speed of learning. In the second
phase, however, the four-year-old children made more errors
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than the other two age groups who were not significantly
different from each other."
Secondly, overall retention is well below 100% and thirdly,
the BD scores are, as the authors, themselves, put it, "less than
perfeot".
However, a decrement produced by the random phase could be more
directly tested by comparing a group of subjects trained exactly
according to Bryant and Trabasso's procedure (i.e. with a separate
pair, serial phase followed by a concurrent random phase) with another
group for whom serial training is conserved throughout.
PILOT STUDY
Six "pilot" subjects were trained using a box which was designed
as far as possible according to the description Bryant and Trabasso (1971)
gave of their own apparatus:
"The rods were presented in pairs throughout the
experiment. The pairs were always presented in such a
way that each rod protruded from the top of a container
by one inch. The equal protrusion was achieved by
sinking bores of different lengths in the container box."





The behaviour and comments of these subjects, however, suggested
that, despite repeated explanations about the way in which the stimuli
were contained in the box, they could only solve the questions by
seeking minute (and possibly imagined) variation in the portions of
the sticks actually presented. Several children would bend down and
peer closely at the sticks, saying, for example, "I wanted to take a
good look at them first and not make a mistake", "it's a wee bit of
a different size", or "it looks longer". The presentation was there¬
fore changed to the one described below as it was thought that the
difficulty may have been related to the fact that the sticks may have
appeared to have been somehow "suspended" in an unlikely manner.
EXPERIMENT 1
SUBJECTS
Subjects for this and all the other experiments reported in these
chapters were drawn from a set of corporation primary and nursery
schools in the centre of Edinburgh. In all schools, the subjects were
from very mixed socio-economic backgrounds, ranging from "professional"
to "working-class" homes. Several children belonged to one-parent
families. The subjects included one West Indian girl, one Indian girl
and one Ioelandic girl. The rest were British.
Subjects for Experiment 1 were six pre-school and six school¬
children with a mean age of 4 years 11 months and a range of 4.10 to
5.2. There were six boys and six girls.
STIMULI .
The stimuli were wooden cylindrical stioks of diameter 5". The
set of sticks used and the subsets in which they were presented to
the subjeot are shown in Table 1. (over)•
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TABLE 1. Stimulus Set
Subsets: Pair Pair Pair Pair
1 2 3 4
Stick: A £ B C C D D E
♦Colour: eg Red Yellow Yellow Blue Blue White White Green
Length: (a) 2?" 3i" 33" 4" 4" 43" 43" 5i"
i (*} 5sf" 43" 43" 4" 4" 34" 3k" 2*"
* Colour was counterbalanced acoording to a Latin Square Design
APPARATUS
The sticks could be placed, two at a time, half an inch apart
in a wooden base which supported them in an upright position behind
a wooden screen to which the base was affixed. The soreen was 12"
by 7" and was painted dark red. A white-painted, vertically-sliding
door with a cut-out aperture (3" wide) could be moved up and down in
front of the sticks,so that when completely lowered it revealed an
equal (2") portion of the bases of the stimuli but obscured their
actual extents. A second sliding door made of sheet metal moved up
and down behind the wooden door suoh that when completely lowered it
totally obscured the stimuli. A diagram (not drawn to scale) of the









Subjects were randomly assigned to one set of five sticks and
randomly assigned to one of two groups; Replication (six subjects)
and Serial (six subjects). Half the subjects in each group were
given length series (a), while half were given length series (b) (see
Table 1.). (It should be noted that as subjects did not actually see
the relative lengths of the sticksi the provision of a physical series
was for the experimenter's benefit during training)
PROCEDURE
Pre-training
The subject was familiarized with the apparatus by presenting
him with a pair of unpainted sticks which corresponded in length to
a randomly selected stimulus pair. The unpainted sticks were placed
in the apparatus with both doors raised so that the subject could see
their respective lengths. He was asked "Which is the longer one?" or
"Which is the shorter one?" and, after he had responded by pointing,
both doors were lowered. A strip of paper was slipped over the doors
and the subject was asked to indioate with a pencil where each stick
"came up to behind the doors". This was repeated five times. The
left-right positions of the sticks were randomly varied. Three
"shorter" and three "longer" questions were randomly interspersed.
If a subject responded correctly to 6/6 questions and was prepared to
represent on the paper the unseen length differences, then he was
started on the training phases.
Training
Subjeots viewed equal portions of the stimulus pairs and were
trained to label each stick correctly as longer or shorter than the
other stick with which it was paired. A trial commenced when a pair
of sticks was placed in the apparatus with both doors lowered and
faoing the subject. The metal door was raised revealing an equal
portion of the sticks and the subject was asked "Which is longer?"
or "Which is shorter?". After responding subjects were given verbal
corrective feedback, e.g. "no, that's wrong, blue is shorter" or
"yes, that's right, red is longer" and the metal door was lowered.
Training was conducted in two phases. In Phase I each pair was learned
separately and in order from 1 to 4. Subjects were required to reach
a oriterion of 8/10 correct before proceeding to the next pair. In
Phase II stimuli were presented in runs of four single presentations
of eaoh pair. For subjects in the Serial group, the pairs in every
run were presented in order from 1 to 4. For subjects in the
Replication group the pairs were presented in random order which was
varied across runs. Both groups were required to reach a criterion
of 6 out of 6 successive correct on each pair. "Longer" and "shorter"
questions were counterbalanced across trials within every pair. The
left-right positions of the sticks varied randomly aoross trials.
Subjects were rejected*from the experiment if they required more than
30 trials on any pair in Phase I or more than 200 trials altogether
in Phase II.
+
Bryant and Trabasso did not report the rejection of subjects, the
use of a rejection criterion, nor the acquisition performances.
With no guidelines to follow, subjeots trained at the outset of
the above experiment were, in fact, rejected only after (in
several cases) over a thousand trials on the random phase. The
rejection criterion was introduced only after about two months of
slow progress had been made with the experiment.
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Testing
After successful completion of Phase II of Training, subjects
were tested on all binary permutations of the stimulus set: their
original training pairs, A£, BC, CD, DE, and the novel combinations
AC, AD, AE, BD, BE and CE. These pairs were randomly ordered in
blocks of 13 - where the "crucial" pairs BC, CD and BD were presented
twice each and the others were presented once, lour blocks were
given altogether to each subjeot. No corrective feedback was given.
The left-right positions of the sticks was counterbalanced across the
trials for a given pair. "Longer" and "shorter" questions varied
randomly with the constraint that each pair was associated equally
often with each type of question.
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RESULTS*
Table 2 shows the numbers of subjects who were rejected at
different points throughout the experiment.
TABLE 2. A. Lumber of Subjects Tested and Rejected
No. of Mean
Subjects Age
Total started 33 4.10
Tested 12 4.11
Rejected 21 4.9









Bryant and Trabasao do not report the more detailed aspects of
their data such as acquisition scores, eto. Riley and Trabasso,
however, repeated Bryant and Trabasso's second experiment (1971»
Experiment 2) with subjects of median age 4.8 and report the
results in some detail (Riley and Trabasso, 1974, Experiment I).
Where appropriate therefore, these results are included in the
next section.
Table 3 shows the acquisition performance with data from Riley
and Trabasso (1974) Experiment I in parenthesis.
TABLE 3. Mean Number of Trials to Criterion with
Trial of Last Error (in brackets)
A. Separate Pair Training (Phase I)
Pair AB BC CD DE Mean
Replication
Group (K«6) 1.5 (1.7) 1.0 (1.0) 1.2 (1.3) 0.0 (0.0) 0.9 (1.0)
Serial




1.4 (3.1) 1.1 (2.2) 1.2 (2.2) 1.1 (2.1) 1.2 (2.4)
B. Concurrent Pair Training (Phase IX)
Pair AB BC CD DE Mean
Replication
Group (N*6) 4.0 (16.6) 4.5 (21.0) 7.5 (14.5) 3.8 (16.3) 4.9 (17.0)
Serial




2.6 (6.9) 5.4 (10.9) 4.1 (9.4) 3.1 (7.3) 3.8 (8.6)
The Replication group and Riley and Trabasso*s group show aerial
position effects with the middle pairs taking longer to learn than the
end pairs.
Table 4 (over) shows the test performance of both groups combined.
TABLE 4. Probabilities of Correot Choioea In Testing;
B C D E






* Significantly above chance on a Binomial
test, (p < 0.01.)
Table 5 (over) shows the test performance of the two groups.
The Replication group is compared with Bryant and Trabasso's data
(Experiment 2 ). Data from Riley and Trabasso are shown in parenthesis.
The test performances of the Replication and Serial groups were
compared. The only significant difference between individual pairs
across the two groups was on DE, where the Serial group were lower
than the Replication group (x sig. at p< 0.01). The Serial group
performed better on all the test pairs when they were considered
oolleotively (the "test" pairs refers here to pairs AC, AD, AE, BD,
2
BE and CE) than did the Replication group (x sig. at p < 0.01) while
the training pairs (AB, BC, CD and DE) were not different when
considered collectively.
Table 6 (p 30) oomparea the obtained BD scores reported above
with the predictions made by Bryant and Trabasso's "memory hypothesis";
i.e. the Cartesian product of BC and CD.
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TABLE 5. Probabilities of Correct Choices in Testing
Replication Group (N=6) Serial Group (N=6)
B c D E B c D E
A *K"\00• .67 .62 •58 A • 00 V>l* .62 • 0000 .83*
B .72* •53 •58 B .70* •64 .79*
C .72* .79* C .61 .75*
D 1.00* D .67
Biyant and Trabasso
Expt. II (4 yr. olda) (N»20)
B C D E
A .98* .98* .93* .97*
B .89* .82* .90*
C CO• *COCO•
D .94*
Riley and Trabasso (N=20)
B C D E
A .96* •81* .75* .86*
B .66* 00VO• .80*
C .79* .76*
D • 00 VJ1*
* Significantly above chance on a Binomial Test (p< 0.01)
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TABLE 6. Comparison of Obtained BP scores v/ith Predictions









Groups Combined (N=12) .58 .48 -.10
Replication Group (N=6) .53 .52 -.01
Serial Group (Ns=6) ♦64 .43 -.21
Bryant and Trabasso (N»20) .82 .77 -.05




The most striking findings from the first experiment are: -
a) the apparent inability of mary subjects to learn the task at
all, and
b) the poor test performances of both groups as compared with both
Bryant and Trabasso's subjects and (to a lesser extent) those
of Riley and Trabasso.
One plausible reason for this is suggested by Riley and Trabasso (1974)
where they report that the original training box used by Bryant and
Trabasso was a five-holed box in which the sticks were given fixed
positions isomorphic with the series itself, i.e. A B C D £. The
extent to which this provided a strong spatial cue in training is
unclear. Bryant and Trabasso report taking measures to randomise the
left-right positions within each pair: "the positions of the rods
(left and right) were varied in an irregular order from trial to trial",
and yet the manner in which this was achieved was not stated. At the
very least, this would seem to involve a very clumsy procedure requir¬
ing either two boxes with direction opposed or a rotation of the
apparatus to ensure symmetry. It is possible that two independent
isotropic series were thus constructed, each with a visual analogue
in real space. Bryant and Trabasso do not state whether the training
box was used in testing or whether, at this point, recourse was made
to a two-hol^dbox.
As this was considered to be such an important aspect of the
failure to replicate, a letter was sent to Dr. Bryant in June 1974,
in which, amongst other things, he was asked for clarification on the
above points. This letter is reproduced in the Appendix. No reply
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was ever received. To some extent the matter has now been clarified
by Riley and Trabasso (1974) who acknowledge the strong possibility
of artefact in the original experiment and who, themselves, took steps
to eliminate it from their own studty- already cited in the results
section. However, they did not U3e a two-holed box in training as an
alternative. Rather, they screened off the irrelevant portion of a
five-holed box when any two sticks were being viewed. Again it is
unclear as to how counterbalancing or randomising of left/right positions
was achieved, and (as either the box or the screen must be moved to
reveal the "next" pair of stimuli) it still leaves open the possibility
that strong spatial/directional cues may have operated.
Despite the poor performances of both groups, a distinct
advantage appears to have operated for the Serial group. Hot only
was the BD bias higher for this group (and may well have reached
significance had a larger "K" been used), but all the test pairs were
better when considered collectively. However, the training pairs did
not show an overall superiority (nor did any single training pair).
Thus, the relationship between training and test performance does not
appear to be a direct function of retention. This is oonfirmed ty
Table 6 which shows the failure of Bryant and Trabasso's "memory
hypothesis" to account for the "less than perfect" BD scores, by the
argument that these are a joint function of retention on BC and CD,
i.e. PgC x rCD « P^,
EXPERIMENT 2
RATIONALE
The only criterion for a "genuine transitive inference" in Bryant
and Trabasso's experiment is the achievement of a correct answer to the
BP question. The operations of transformation, inference or co-ordination
must be inferred from the profile of correot ohoices. However, this
inferenoe has strong justification if the "correct" response is in fact
a novel one, e.g. B<A:B>C.*.A>C. The main problem with
Bryant and Trabasso's "correct" response, e.g. B > D, is that the actual
response, or relational term, is already part of the response set
produoed by training. It is, however, possible to devise versions of
the paradigm (which also eschew difficulties with end-point labelling)
whioh help to make explicit whether or not acts of transformation are
normal in the context of such tests given to young children. Thus it
was decided to compare a group of children for whoa a transitive
response was made likely by the training response set with a second
group for whom it was not made likely unless these subjects could
reoover and exploit information not actually given. This was done by
emphasising, for the first group, only those items oongruent with the
transitive direction of choice for BD, i.e.@B (B) C C (£j) P (S^ and
conversely for the other group, i.e. A® B<£)(S)P Q)E (the circled
items are those emphasised in training).
EXPERIMENT 2
SUBJECTS
The subjects were six presohool and six schoolchildren with a




The stimuli and apparatus wore identical to those used in
Experiment 1.
DESIGN
The subjects were randomly assigned to one of two groups, A (six
subjects) and B (six subjects). The training schemes for these groups
are shown in Table 7 (over)•
PROCEDURE
Training
Subjects were trained as in Experiment 1 but only one question
type was used for a given pair (see Table 7«)» ^he same rejection
criterion was used as in Experiment 1.
Testing
~TW Hv> GC D ^B'j n «ere presented in four blocks of
single, randomly ordered presentations per pair. Both question types
were asked vdthin every pair. Question type varied randomly across
trials with the constraint that each pair was associated with two












































































































Table 8. shows the numbers of subjects who were rejected from
the experiment (all of these subjects were rejected during Phase II
of training).
TABLE 8, Number of Subjects Tested and Rejected
53O • O Mean
Subjeots Age
Total Started 24 5.1
Tested 12 5.1
Rejected 12 5.1
Table 9 shows the acquisition performance with data from Riley
and Trabasso (1974) Experiment II in parenthesis, (see over)
Table 10 (p 38) shows the test profile in terms of the responses
to the original training question (O.R.) and in terms of the responses
to the "reciprocal" relation (R.R.).
As with Experiment 1, the results are compared where possible with
data from Riley and Trabasso (1974)• This data was obtained in an
experiment (Experiment Hi) similar to Experiment 2,hare.Riley and
Trabasso only used one comparative term per pair, but used both
comparatives across pairs, thus produoing a heterotropic series.
The structure of this series, however, did not correspond with
either presented here as the comparative terms were alternated across
pairs. Secondly, Riley and Trabasso do not report the retrieval
of the reciprocal information separately in the test scores. For
this reason, therefore, only the acquisition scores are directly
compared in the following section.
TABLE 9. Mean. Lumber of Trials to Criterion v/ith
Trials of Last Error (in brackets)
A. Separate Pair Training (Phase l)
Pair AB BC CD DE Mean
Group A
(N=6; 1.2 (2.2) 1.0 (1.2) 0.8 (1.5) 1.0 (1.8) 1.0 (1.7)
Group B




1.2 (2.7) 1.0 (2.0) 0.6 (0.8) 0.6 (1.4) 0.9 (1.7)
B. Concurrent Pair Training (Phase II)
Pair AB BC CD DE Mean
Group A
(K=6)
6 (17.7) 4 (15.2) 5.5 (14) 5 (11.3) 5.1 (14.5)
Group B











































































Table 11 shows the overall performance to "original relation"
questions in testing and "reciprocal relation" questions, for both
group8 combined.
TABLE 11. Percentage of Correct Responses
Pair A B B C C D D E Mean
O.R. .92* .79* #COCO9f .84* * 00 *5
R.R. •46 •46 .38 .66 .49




The above experiments were designed as a first exploratory-
investigation of Bryant and Trabasso's paradigm and of the possibility
that the representational form of the task is not an achievement of
the subject's own "operations" as a co-ordination or integration model
would demand, but a reflection of the "structure" of the task.
Despite the tentative nature of these experiments and the initial
(and rather surprising) inability to replicate Bryant and Trabasso's
original results, the results from Experiment 2 suggest two fairly
clear findings:
a) that subjects are unable to retrieve "reciprocal" information,
b) "transitive" responses can only be produced when the emphasis
given to certain terms in training is congruent with the
transitive direction of choioe.
The transitive response on BD produced by group A is consistent with
a "labelling" effect or effect of "direct statement" (Hunter, 1957).
The chance performance produced by group B, however, suggests that
"labelling" is not entirely straightforward, as a simple "echo" (Hunter,
1957) of B and/or D's label would predict a significant intransitive
response. It seems, therefore, that "labelling", if it occurs, inter¬
acts with the overall directional structure of the series.
Overall, it can be seen that these subjects appear to be inoapable
of performing the operations of "conversion" implied by a co-ordination
or integration model of transitive reasoning. The asymmetry between
the groups shows furthermore the apparent lack of an "invariant"
underlying strategy. It is therefore a significant finding in the
oontext of models of constructive thinking for, as Click and V/apner (1968)
at* jj ^ M
point out, "one can attribute an ability to a subject only if it can
be shown that he performs in a relatively uniform manner across a
variety of tasks calling that ability into play". It is a particu¬
larly significant finding in the context of Bryants own suggestion
(1977) that evidence against their position would have to show a
variation in response profile despite identical training criteria;
"Since we pointed out in 1971 that it was essential to
check for memory in these experiments, no one has been
able to produce one single instanoe of a child who can
remember the information essential for an inference, but
oannot combine it inferentially." (p 62)
If subjects can be regarded as deficient in the constructive
abilities necessary to the performance of these tasks in a "logical"
manner, can their (apparent) limitations be more specifically located?
The results from the above experiment strongly suggest that the
children's major difficulty is with the relational terms themselves.
No such suggestion is made by Bryant and Trabasso who, in fact, conolude
that an entirely linguistic form of the task (1971, Experiment 2) is
no more difficult than one in which there is a conorete reference
provided in the visual field. Bryant (l973b*» furthermore, seems to
imply that such linguistic solutions are based on a fundamental ability
to perceive and understand relationships per se. -<hen discussing
children as young as four years of age, he says: "One certainty is
that they are able to recognise broad relationships suoh as "larger"
and "smaller" " (p 35)• Nevertheless, the question of the child's
competence in this sphere remains - for his understanding of relational
terms is not well docurnanted (see Nelson, 1976), and as '.Vales and
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Campbell point out, it cannot be assumed that "this linguistic ability-
is available" /_ to the childJ "simply because he uses these expressions
in certain spontaneous situations". (Wales and Campbell, 1970)
In the absence of any direot evidence, therefore, Bryant's basis
for belief that young children can both understand and co-ordinate
relational terms at the logico/linguistic level is, at best, inferred
from:
a) evidenoe from perceptual coding mechanisms which suggests that
these are primarily relational. Using this evidenoe and
ignoring the views of many investigators, e.g. Piaget (1964)»
Kohler (19 30) and Werner (1948), that relational perception
does not necessarily imply a perception of relations per se,
Bryant fails to consider the distinction between perceptual
and cognitive/linguistic levels of operation. He thus implies
that linguistio oodes are a direct reflection of peroeptual ones.
b) the transitivity results of four year olds in the course of
tests where "no visual feedback" has been given. The inference
here is that such results could not have been achieved had the
four-year-old been unable to comprehend the relational terms
used. However, no direot evidence on relational term
comprehension is provided.
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 reported here suggest strongly,
however, that even in the so-called "no visual feedback" condition, a
strong visuo-spatial cue was available to subjects and, furthermore,
that the assumption that transitivity inevitably implies full relational
comprehension and co-ordination is unwarranted.
This is not to say that the child of four has no comprehension
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whatsoever of such terms. The key issue is whether suoh a child
understands the implications of relational terms delivered in a purely
linguistic form so as to enable him both to seriate and reason
deductively; or whether he has a much more rudimentary ability and
requires, at this stage, direct perceptual provocation before he can
use relational terms appropriately and thus effectively. As James
(1891) points out
"Relation is a very slippery word. It has 30 mary
different concrete meanings that the use of it as an
abstract universal may easily introduce bewilderment
into our thought. We must therefore be careful to
avoid ambiguity by making sure, whenever we have to
employ It, what its preoise meaning is in that
particular sphere of application." (p 149)
The experiments outlined in the next chapter report an attempt to
discover what "conorete meanings", if any, relational terms may have
for the young child.
CHAPTER THREE
As Wittengenstein (see Kenny, 1973) points out, relational terms
do not "denote", i.e. stand in place of, or signify any material
property of the world of a perceiver. As put, the genesis of relational
terms would appear to be linguistic. This, certainly, is the view of
the Behaviourist, Spence (1937&) who suggests that language transcends
fundamental perceptual operations (which Spence believes to be based
on the coding of "absolute" stimulus values).
Evidence for this view has been sought by followers of Spence
(Kuenne, 1946j Alberts and Ehrenfreund, 1951) who believe that the
"higher"-level relational mode of responding, if "mediated" by language,
ought to be well-correlated with the ability to verbalise relational
terms. This hypothesis was evaluated in the light of evidence obtained
from transposition experiments where, conventionally, subjects are
presented with two stimuli differing along a single dimension of ohange
such as size, pitch or brightness and are then trained to choose, e.g.
the bigger of the two. In a second, transfer, phase subjects are given
a different pair of stimuli but differing along the same dimension as
the original pair. "Relational" responding is presumed to be demon¬
strated ty the transfer of response to the bigger, brighter, eto. of
the two "novel" stimuli. In order to establish the degree of correla¬
tion between relational responding and "mediating" ability, it is
necessary to couple transposition tasks with independent tests of
verbal ability. Several techniques are used to do this. A pre-test
may be given (Reese, 1961j Spiker, Gerjuoy and Shepard, 1956) in which
subjects are asked verbally to point to e.g. the "larger" or "smaller"
of two stimuli. Subjects are then oategorised on the basis of their
performance into a "premedieting" or a "mediating" group. They may,
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on the other hand, be categorised post-experimentally (Stevenson and
Bitterman, 1955/» Occasionally, a "mediational" stimulus (such as,
for example, a nonsense word) is actually trained in the context of the
experiment itself and subjects thus trained are compared with a control
group who were given no "mediational" stimulus. Overall, the results
of these kinds of expei'iment suggest a relationship between mediation
ability and the lack of the "Distance Effect" (a restriction of the
range of values across which a subject will "transpose"; Ehrenfreund,
1952; Honig, 1962; Kuenne, 1946; Spence, 1937b),but the conclusion
that this is a direct result of an increased ability to respond
relationally is far from clear (see Reese, 1968). Many negative
results and confounding factors (not the least of which is the increase
in the chronological age of the subject (Reese, 1962) make the overall
results from Mediation experiments far from conclusive. Even where
verbal instructions have been found to affect the kind of response
given in transposition tests, i.e. "relative" or "absolute", (Zeiler
and Selten, 1967; Riley et al, 1966), it is doubtful that such
consequences of instruction are the result of language per se. McGonigle
and Jones (197?b) have found similar effects using non-human subjects
when the "judgmental criteria" manipulated are purely perceptual ones.
On the perceptual side, relational theories such as those of the
Gestalt school, have been less concerned with developmental/linguistic
effects (Koffka's "Growth of the Mind" (1924) notwithstanding). They
have been concerned, rather, with demonstrating the ubiquity of
relational responses.
"Reviewing our observations .... we find that everywhere
the aspect of sensor;/ experience depends upon the
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properties of stimuli in their mutual interrelationship."
(Kbhler, 1930, p 96).
Gestalt theory, however, embraces the more complex questions of
relational responding such as those concerning "levels" of psycho¬
logical operation. Most Gestaltists distinguish, for example, between
the determinants of experience (these are the "mutual interrelation¬
ships") and their phenomenal products (these are what Koffka (1924)
describes as "configurative phenomena".) Thus, relations are in
Koffka's terms "silent" and "not normally experienced in the sensory
field" (Kohler, 1930 p 166).
Recently, a much simplified version of this perceptual/relational
theory has been advanced by Bryant (1973b) who argues that "relative
codas" are fundamental even to the operations of very young children.
"Absolute" codes, by contrast, are slow to develop and even in the
adult do not make for accurate judgments. The "novel" aspect of his
position, as he puts it, is the mechanism which he proposes is used
by children to "get round" the difficulties encountered by their having
only "relative codes" at their disposal.
"If a child who uses primarily a relative code is shown
a single object, he will not ordinarily be able to
remember much about for instance its absolute size,
because he has no effective way of recording it. In
fact, if he depends on registering relations, the only
way he can remember its actual size, to compare it to
other sizes, is to relate it to the size of some constant
background feature (if one is available) and then to use
this relation inferentially." (p 12)
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In making this statement Bryant assumes two "faots" about the
behaviour of young children, for which he has no direct evidenoe.
Firstly, he assumes (without adequate reference to the "literature"
on this matter) that children are unable to make single, "absolute"
judgments. His argument that this inability "oan be overcome" by
inferential meohanisms rests however on data from transposition and
other experiments which have not directly tested the subject's ability
to make single stimulus judgments.* Nowhere does Bryant indicate
evidenoe to show that, when asked to do so. ohildren cannot make
appropriate judgments of single stimuli under conditions where no
obvious basis for an "inference" is available. Secondly, Bryant
implies that relative codes allow a child to operate as competently
at an abstraot logico-linguistio level as at a peroeptual (and ooncrete)
one, by failing to acknowledge that there may be qualitative differences
between the two - as outlined, for example, by Werner (1948).
"..... two separate phases are often observable in the
thought processes of comparison. The first is the
formation of a perceptual relationship - the relation
between two parts is grasped in a certain configuration.
The seoond is the derivative abstract form of the
relationship as expressed in a verbally constituted
judgment." (p 221)
These studies, furthermore, do not normally establish ty
instruction or other means the oriteria (i.e. "relative" or
"absolute") by which the subject is expected to judge the test
stimuli. Where such instructions have been given (Zeiler and
Sal ten, 1967» Riley et al, 1966) it has been found, in fact,
that "absolute" instructions reduce transposition.
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If Bryant had investigated the "verbally expressed judgments" of
children (independently from his "inference" tests), he would surely
have enoountered some of the limitations even on their "concrete"
comprehension indicated by investigators in this area (Clark, 1973?
Donaldson and Wales, 1970? Donaldson and Lloyd, 19 66). An immediate
question raised by these findings is: by what criteria does a verbally
expressed judgment indicate an "understanding"of relational terms?
Mere utterance is, as Seles and Campbell (1970) point out, no criterion
for understanding:
"It is a matter of considerable practical and
theoretical importance to explore the child's develop¬
ing ability to comprehend and appropriately produce
these kinds of constructions and not to assume that
this linguistic ability is available to him simply
because he uses these expressions in certain
'spontaneous * situations.
Thus, a second "fact" assumed by Bryant is that young children's
use of relational terms indioates true comprehension. As pointed out
in Chapter Two the argument which appears to justify this assumption
is circular. Without an independent criterion for comprehension,
therefore, there is no telling just how rudimentary the ohlld's under¬
standing is. In an attempt to clarify this matter it was decided to
provide subjeots with two simple tasks of "oonorete" comprehension -
one simultaneous and one successive. In the simultaneous case, subjeots
were required to categorise an array of sticks of different sizes into
"big" ones, "small" ones, "taller" ones, eto. In the successive case




The subjects were 20 children (10 boys and 10 girls) with mean
age 4 years 9 months and a range of 4.3 to 5*6. They all attended
primary or nursery schools in Edinburgh*
STIMULI
The stimuli were wooden cylindrical sticks of diameter 1*5 cm.
and they differed in length on a ratio scale of 1s1.1. Their sizes
are shown in Table 12.
TABLE 12
Stick No 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Size
(in cms) 5.3 5.8 6.4 7.0 7.7 8.5 9.4 10.3 11.3 12.5 13.7 15.1
DESIGN
All subjects were presented with two sets of sticks in order to
assess the extent to which they could use relational terms to reflect
the sizes of the particular set of sticks in front of them. The sets
were overlapping in size range in order that stimuli common to both
could be used as a yardstick of the change in the judgment of particular
sticks wrought by changes in the stimulus set aa a whole. Subjects
were allocated randomly to two groups, A (10 subjeots) and B (lOsubjects).
The stimulus sets presented to these groups are shown in Table 13 (over).
The experimental phases are shown in Table 14 (over).
PROCEDURE
The experiment was conducted in four phases which were run (as
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Phase I
Stimuli were arranged randomly in a horizontal array supported
in an upright position on a white wooden base* The subject was asked
to indicate, by pointing, which sticks he thought were e.g* the big
ones, followed by the bigger ones, the tall ones, the taller ones, the
long ones, the longer ones, the short ones, the shorter ones, the small
ones, the smaller ones, the little ones and the middle-sized ones.
This was repeated twice. The 12 instructions were always given in
random order and the arrangement of the sticks was changed before each
instruction block.
Phase II
Subjeots were given one rehearsal block of instructions with Set 1
as in Phase I, The stimuli were then removed from the subject^ view
and re-presented singly and in random order, standing upright on a
small white wooden base. The subject viewed each stimulus and was asked
by the experimenter: "Is that a big one, a small one or a middle-sized
one?". A seoond run in a different random order was given, this time
using the question: "Is that a short one, a long one or a middle-sized
one?". The first two runs were repeated using a different random
presentation each time. The order of size terms in each question was
randomly varied aoross trials. Half the subjects in each group started
with a big/small/iai^dle",*sij!®d run and the other half started with a
long/short/middle-si2ed run.
Phase III
Subjects were presented with Set 2 and the procedure was followed
as in Phase I.
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Phase IV
Subjects were rehearsed with one run on Set 2 and the procedure
followed as in Phase III.
All stimuli were viewed against a white background. Subjects
were intermittently told that they were "doing well" but no specific
reinforoement was given. All responses were recorded on a videotape
reoorder for subsequent analysis.
COMPUTATION 01 RESULTS
As all subjects showed high internal consistency across runs and
across sessions, the results in the following section are tabulated




Table 15a. and b. shows the frequenoy distribution of choices
made by both groups of subjects in response to the 12 types of question
asked during simultaneous presentation of the sticks.
TABLE 15. Frequency of Choice during
Simultaneous Presentation
a. Group A (h»lO)
Stick Ro: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total
Set 1
Little 38 24 18 08 04 00 00 00 92
Small 38 38 23 09 07 00 00 00 115
Smaller 39 35 19 11 03 01 00 00 108
Short 24 25 24 17 17 09 01 01 118
Shorter 28 27 25 18 15 06 03 01 123
Middle-sized 11 13 20 26 22 15 05 01 113
Big 00 02 04 10 14 27 35 37 129
Bigger 01 02 03 09 17 25 33 36 126
Tall 03 02 03 09 14 19 35 34 119
Taller 03 03 04 09 10 23 32 33 117
Long 05 03 05 07 12 29 35 36 132
Longer 01 01 02 08 16 25 29 31 113
Set 2
Little 36 32 23 08 03 02 01 00 105
Small 36 29 20 07 02 02 03 02 101
Smaller 36 29 20 06 01 02 01 02 97
Short 26 25 26 16 09 04 02 02 110
Shorter 22 26 21 13 06 04 04 03 99
Middle-sized 13 15 21 21 20 12 06 01 109
Big 02 01 01 03 15 26 36 34 118
Bigger 02 03 02 09 19 25 33 34 127
Tall 01 01 07 07 12 18 31 32 109
Taller 04 02 04 07 12 16 35 34 114
Long 00 02 01 07 18 22 32 36 118
Longer 03 00 05 05 13 24 32 32 114
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b. Group B (K=1Q)
Stick No: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total
Set 1
Little 38 30 19 14 06 05 01 01 114
Small 40 29 21 14 07 03 00 00 114
Smaller 39 30 25 16 07 04 00 00 121
Short 21 20 20 15 12 07 06 07 108
Shorter 23 25 20 16 10 06 07 05 112
Middle-sized 17 16 23 22 13 07 05 05 108
Big 00 00 00 03 12 19 39 39 112
Bigger 00 00 00 03 08 13 30 39 93
Tall 06 04 06 04 11 17 30 34 112
Taller 05 06 05 05 11 17 29 33 111
Long 00 00 01 04 09 15 32 39 100
Longer 00 00 00 02 07 14 31 39 93
m.,2
Little 40 30 24 19 13 09 03 01 139
Small 40 31 22 13 09 07 02 01 125
Smaller 40 35 24 15 13 08 03 01 139
Short 22 24 20 16 13 14 13 07 129
Shorter 23 21 15 12 08 07 13 08 107
Middle-sized 15 14 17 21 19 15 07 09 127
Big 01 00 00 03 05 12 31 38 90
Bigger 00 00 03 03 05 12 25 38 86
Tall 08 09 08 06 04 09 22 31 97
Taller 09 08 07 04 04 09 22 33 96
Long 02 01 03 05 08 11 25 39 94
Longer 00 00 00 03 06 12 25 40 86
Table 16 a. and b. (over) shows the frequency distribution made
by both groups of subjects in response to the two types of cjiestion
asked during successive presentation of the sticks.
TABLE 16» Frequency of Choloe during
Suooeasive iresentation
a. group A (Ka=10)
Stick No: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Set 1
Small 20 14 13 06 01 00 01 00
Middle-sized 00 05 07 13 15 07 02 01
Big 00 00 00 01 04 13 17 19
Short 13 11 09 05 03 05 00 01
Middle-si*ed 03 05 08 15 13 04 02 01
Long 02 02 01 00 04 11 18 18
Set 2
Small 15 11 03 00 01 00 00 00
Middle-sized 05 08 14 11 05 02 02 00
Big 00 01 03 06 15 17 18 20
Short 15 11 07 02 01 00 00 01
Middle-sized 04 08 12 11 05 04 01 00
Long 00 00 01 07 14 16 19 19
"b. Group B (N»10)
Stick No: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Set 1
Small 11 10 07 02 02 01 00 00
Middle-sized 08 08 11 14 13 04 02 00
Big 00 01 02 03 04 15 18 20
Short 08 07 01 04 05 05 03 03
Middle-sized 09 13 16 14 07 06 01 01
Long 00 00 02 02 07 09 16 16
Set 2
Small 14 14 11 09 05 01 00 00
Middle-sized 04 05 08 10 10 08 05 01
Big 01 00 00 00 03 08 15 19
Short 09 08 05 09 06 04 04 02
Middle-sized
Long 8? i°2 8 8! li 12 %
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Inspection of Table 15 suggests that the data may be compressed
into three categories: B (comprising responses to big, bigger, tall,
taller, long and longer), S (comprising responses to small, smaller,
short, shorter, and little) and M (middle-sized). This grouping is
confirmed by a Friedman Two-Way Analysis of Variance which shows high
concordance of the rank distributions within the categories B and S
(p < 0.001, df = 7).
Figure 3 (over) shows the distribution curves for B, S and M. +
Table 17a. and b. shows the relative proportions of responses
to B, S and M for the stimuli which were common to both sets.
TABLE 17. Overall Proportion of Responses to B, S and
H for Sticks 5. 6. 7. 8 (Combined)
(Set 1 and Set 2)
Simultaneous Presentation
Category S M B
Group A
Group B
Set 1 Set 2
.07 .51
.51 .21
Set 1 Set 2
.25 .41
.43 .35




Category S M B
Group A
Group B
Set 1 Set 2
.06 .43
.33 .14
Set 1 Set 2
.28 .45
.60 .34




For B and S these distributions are plotted as the average frequency
across the various questions comprising that category (5 or 6 in the
simultaneous case; 2 in the successive case). M is plotted as the
actual (overall) frequency for the simultaneous case and a3 the average
(overall) frequency across to 2 question types in the successive case.





Set 2 ' !
GROUP B
Set 1
l 1—i—i i i i i i
1 23456 78 12345678
The Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients obtained between
simultaneous and successive distributions are significant at
the 1 percent level.
Set 2
Figure 4. (over) compares the response distributions for the
terms small, big, short and long across simultaneous and successive
conditions.4"
DISCISSION
The results show clearly:
a) that the stimuli were judged relative to the set in whioh they
were embedded irrespective of their actual size on the length
'continuum'j and
b) successive judgments were made as competently as simultaneous
judgments.
Thus the "values" or "adaptation level" for e.g. "big" and "small"
which derived from simultaneous stimulus presentation carried over to
the successive case. It is hardly necessaiy to assume, however, as
Bryant does (I973>b,p12) that such successive judgment is achieved by
the use of deductive inferences which result from the co-ordination of
successive sets of background or framework relationships. On the
contrary, a notion such as Kelson's (1964) whioh postulates that an
internal referent is produced by the pooled or weighted average of
past and present stimulation could handle the results adequately.
Thus, stimuli above the adaptation level are deemed "big" and those
below it are judged as "small". Unsurprising as these results mi^tit
be in the context of A.L. theory, the interesting question which remains
concerns the factors which allow the subject to isolate one set of
values from another such that the pooled average is not affected or
distorted by the inclusion of those stimuli which lie without the set
or collection. One clue to such isolation is given in the study of
weight judgment by Brown (1953) which shows the impact of categorical
+
These distributions are plotted as a proportion of the total response
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criteria in insulating stimulus values of one category from those in
another. Brown found that when a subject was casually asked to move
a heavy tray "out of the way" it had no effect on the adaptation level
presumably because it was considered to lie outside the stimulus series.
In the case of subjects in Experiment 3 both the colour of the sticks
and their spatio-temporal isolation (as sets) could have produced set
independence. For a young, and ostensibly "concrete" subject, however,
we might expect stimulus proximity (both spatial and temporal) to be
the most important single determinant of the identity of a collection.
Piaget (1964) cites an example of this in which a five-year-old subject
divided a set of red circles into small ones and large ones; when
presented with blue circles he divided these also into small and large
but added them into his collection of red circles.
In the next experiment therefore, the question is asked : does
the child add hi3 collections (i.e. both red and green) together, when




The same subjects were used as in Experiment 3*
STIMULI
The stimuli were those used in Experiment 3*
DESIGN









The same criteria for simultaneous and successive judgments were
used as in Experiment 3*
PROCEDURE
The experiment was oonduoted in two phases carried out on the two
consecutive days immediately following Phase IV of Experiment 3. The
16 sticks from Sets 1 and 2 were presented singly and in random order
as in the successive presentation phases of Experiment 3* However,
to minimise the load on the subject only one run of each question type
was given.
Phase II
The sticks were randomly arranged in a horizontal array of 16 and
three runs were given as in the simultaneous phases of Experiment 3.
Responses were recorded as in Experiment 3»
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RESULTS
Table 19a. and b. shows the frequenoy distribution made by both
groups of subjects in response to the two types of question asked
during combined successive presentation of both sets of sticks.
TABLE 19. Frequency of Choioe during
Combined Successive Presentation
a. Croup A (K*10)
Stick No: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Small







00 00 00 00 00
Middle-sized







05 04 01 01 00
Big







05 06 09 09 10







02 00 00 00 01
Middle-sized









04 02 00 00 00
Long







04 08 10 10 09
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TABLE 19.
b. G-roup B (N=10)
Stick No: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Small









00 01 00 00
Middle-sized









01 00 01 00






02 inNoo 10 08 09 10
Short









02 02 02 01
Middle-sized









02 01 00 00









06 07 08 09
Table 20 a. and b. (over) shows the frequency distribution of
choices made by both groups of aibjeots in response to the 12 types
of question asked during the combined simultaneous presentation of
both sets of sticks.
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TABU! 20. Frequency of Choice daring Combined
Simultaneous Presentation
a. Syoup A (l.xrlO)
Stick ho: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12







00 02 00 01 01







01 00 02 02 02
Smaller 26 25 17 13 o oV*o 0103 0102 01 01 02 02







06 04 01 03 04







04 03 02 02 01
Middle-sized







10 05 02 01 00
Big







03 11 19 29 25
Bigger







05 12 17 25 27
Tall







05 10 14 25 26
Taller





04 11 14 25 25
Long







07 11 19 25 26
Longer







08 15 19 27 15
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b. Group B (N=10)
Stick No: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Little









02 03 02 02
Small









04 03 01 01









05 03 03 02









06 03 04 05
Shorter









08 07 07 08
Middle-sized









08 05 05 06









12 17 24 29









12 14 24 30
Tall









08 14 17 24
Taller









05 12 16 25









10 14 19 27









11 19 20 30
To aid comparison, the data are combined (as in Kxperiment 1)
into S, M and B. Figure 5 (over) shows the frequency distribution
curves for combined successive and combined simultaneous presentation
of both sets of stimuli, for both groups. To improve clarity the
responses to the overlapping sticks are represented on the graphs as
the mean response for each pair of identical stimuli. The frequencies
are plotted as before.
FIGURE 5 RESPONSE DISTRIBUTIONS FOR CATEGORIES B. M AND S.
GROUP A
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A Kendall Coefficient of Concordance (Siegel, 1956) shows that
the choice distributions are equivalent for both groups and also for
both types of presentation for all three categories (X sig. at p< 0.001
df » 11).
Table 21 shows the relative choice proportions for the stimuli
which were common to both sets.
TABLE 21. Overall iTooortion of Responses to B. 3 and
M for Sticks 5. 6. 7. 8 (Combined)
(Set 1 and Set 2)
a. Successive Presentation
Category- S ii B
Group A
Group B
Set 1 Set 2
.23 .32
.28 .28
Set 1 Set 2
.56 .48
.48 .46




Category- S M B
Group A
Group B
Set 1 Set 2
•32 .23
.35 .40
Set 1 Set 2
•60 .59
.56 .48
Set 1 Set 2
.08 .17
.09 .12
In Figure 6 (over) these proportions are compared with those
from Experiment J.
Figure 7 (p 69) compares the choice proportions for big, small,
long and short across simultaneous and successive presentation.
FIGURE 6 COMPARISON OF RESPONSE DISTRIBUTION FOR S AND B TO
OVERLAPPING STIMULI 5. 6. 7 AND 8









































Proportion of total response to sticks 5» 6, 7 and 8
from Set 1
\ Proportion of total responses to sticks 5> 6, 7 and 8
from Set 2
FIGURE 7 COMPARISON OF SIMULTANEOUS ( ) MP SUCCESSIVE (
RESPONSE DISTRIBUTIONS

























The results show that the subjects abandoned their previous
"labels" and treated the stimuli as a new, combined collection even
when they had only been presented successively. This suggests that
they are not only competent but also, to a certain degree, flexible
in making successive judgments.
Piaget (1964) mentions two possible criteria by which a collection
may be connected - perceived similarity and functional belonging. In
his illustrations, the spatial groups were the ohild's own product.
<( However, others have suggested that spatial proximity (and from
the above results it seems that temporal proximity and succession also
ought to be considered) is an important determinant of what will be
seen to be connected. Laahley (i960) reports that a spider monkey
failed on a matching task unless the discriminanda were actually touch¬
ing one another. In Piaget's own examples, spatial proximity and
functional belonging seem to be closely related in the ohild's mind:
"they're all for the dining room", "all that is for the kitchen" (1964
p 41). Much of Piaget's evidence in fact suggests that up until the
age of six or seven, spatial proximity is a oritioal factor in deter¬
mining what a child will consider as a oolleotion. He cites, for
example, the oase of Dei (5*5), "When the experimenter jumbles the
circles together after Dei has subdivided them into red and blue he
reacts as follows: 'Do they still go together?' - 'No, they don't
go together because they've been disarranged.' " (1964, p 215)
Rather than disarrange the collections of sticks in the present
experimental context it was deoided to introduce new items into the
collection which, if categorized separately, should receive size labels
independently of those given to the sticks.
EXPERIMENT 5
SUBJECTS
The subjects were those used in Experiments 3 and 4.
STIMULI
In addition to those stimuli used in Experiment 4, 10 new stimuli
were used - five 'dolls* and five 'clowns'. Their sizes are shown in
Table 22.
TABLE 22
Doll No. Stick No Clown No.
1 2 3 4 5
(cm.) 5-3 3'6 4-° 4-8
1 ... 12
5.3...15.1
1 2 3 4 5
16.6 18.2 20 22 24.3
DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
Subjects were presented with stimulus Sets 1 and 2 along with the
dolls and clowns.
These were presented randomly in a horizontal array and subjects
were required to make size judgments as in the procedure of the
simultaneous phases of Experiments 3 and 4. Three mns were given.
RESULTS
Table 23 a. and b. (pp 73 - 74) and Eigure 8 (p 75) (plotted as



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The results of Experiment 5 show that, apart from very slight
evidence of a oategorioal "break" between stiok 12 and Clown 1, the
"dolls", "clowns" and sticks were treated as a single collection.
Thus it appears that spatio-temporal proximity is a more important
factor in grouping than is categorisation via object properties per
se.
It would appear, therefore, that the profile which emerges is
fully conoordant with Piaget's conception of the "pre-operational"
child who classifies according to spatial configurations ("graphic
collections"), but cannot co-ordinate the relations of intension and
extension as demanded by a classifioatory "logic" (Piaget, ISdt-).
Furthermore, as the following demonstration will show, this disability




Two subjects were used. They were both girls aged 4.6.
PROCEDURE
Subjects W8re given a set of verbally-presented questions
concerning the relative sizes of animals. The animal names used were
"mouse" and "lion". The size terms used were "baby", "daddy", "bigger",
"smaller", "small", "big" and "wee". In Part A of the procedure
questions were given to establish the child's understanding of these
3ize terms with respect to a single animal class, e.g. "Which is the
•baby* one - a small lion or a big lion?". In Part B questions were
given to establish the extent to whioh the size terms could be appro¬
priately used across the two classes, e.g. "Which is bigger - a 'baby'
lion or a "daddy" mouse?".
Care was taken to avoid, as far as possible, an answer based on
an acoustic "echo" of part of the question as in, for example, "Which
is smaller - a small mouse or a big lion?". Eor this reason the terms
"wee", "baby" and "daddy" were introduced - to provide some variation.
Care was taken also to check that answers were not consistently
based on a "primacy" or "reoenoy" effect, i.e. an "echo" of the first
or last stated alternative in the question.
All responses were recorded by a tape recorder.
RESULTS
The f\ill protocols of both subjects are reproduced below. Nine
of the seventeen Pari: B questions were considered to be particularly
"crucial" in testing the subject's ability to "co-ordinate" at the
verbal level. These are marked with an asterisk.
PROTOCOLS
Subject 1• Eileen Ann
Part A
1. Questions "Which is the 'baby* one - a wee mouse or a big mouse?"
Answers "A wee mouse."
2. Q. "Which is the bigger one - a 'daddy* lion or a *baby' lion?"
A, "A daddy lion."
3. Q. "Which is the 'baby' one «► a wee lion or a big lion?"
A. "A wee lion."
4. Q. "Whioh is the bigger one - a 'daddy' mouse or a 'baby* mouse?"
A. "A daddy mouse,"
Part B
1. Q, "Which is the bigger one - a 'daddy* lion or a 'baby' mouse?"
A. "A daddy lion."
2.* Q. "Which is the 'baby' one - a wee lion or a big mouse?"
A, "A wee lion."
Q. "Vhich is the bigger one - a 'daddy' mouse or a 'baby* lion?"
A. "A daddy mouse."
4. Q« "Which is the 'baby' one - a wee mouse or a big lion?"
A. "A wee mouse."
5. Q. "Which is the bigger one - a wee mouse or a big lion?"
A. "A big lion - mouse!"
6.* Q. "Which is the smaller one - a big mouse or a wee lion?"
A. "A wee lion."
7. Q. "Which is the smaller one - a 'daddy' lion or a 'baby' mouse?"
A, "A baby mouse."
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8. Q. "Which is the smaller one - a big lion or a wee mouse?"
A. "A wee mouse."
9.* Q. "Which is the smaller one - a 'baby' lion or a 'daddy' mouse?"
A. "A baby lion."
Subject 2. Julie
Part A
1. Q. "Which is bigger - a 'daddy* mouse or a 'baby' mouse?"
A. "A daddy mouse."
2. Q. "Which is the 'baby' one - a big lion or a wee lion?"
A. "A wee lion."
3. Q. "Which is bigger - a 'daddy' lion or a 'baby' lion?"
A. "A daddy lion."
Part B
1.* Q. "Which is the 'baby* one - a big mouse or a wee lion?"
A. "A wee lion."
2.* Q. "Which is the bigger one - a 'daddy' mouse or a 'baby' lion?"
A. "A baby lion."
3.* Q. "Which is the 'baby' one - a big mouse or a wee lion?"
A, "A big mouse."
4. Q. "Which is the bigger one - a 'daddy' lion or a 'baby' mouse?"
A. "A daddy lion."
5. Q. "Which is the baby one - a big lion or a wee mouse?"
A. "A wee mouse."
6. Q. "Which is the bigger one - a wee mouse or a big lion?"
A, "A big lion."
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~i•* Q. "Which is the smaller one - a wee lion or a big mouse?"
A. "A wee lion."
8.* Q. "Which is the bigger one - a wee lion or a big mouse?"
A. "A big mouse."
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Seven mistakes were made out of the nine "orucial" questions.
(Eileen Ann; Part B questions 2, 3» 6 and 9; Julie: Part B questions
1,7 and 8). It seems, therefore, that the "correct" answers were
arrived at accidentally, for both subjects showed a consistent strategy
of repeating the phrase whioh "eohoed" the relational term used twice




Considered in the context of Experiments k and 5* the main
implication of the above study is that relational comprehension at the
logico-linguistio level should be sharply distinguished from "concrete"
comprehension. This view is suggested by two findings. The first is
that none of the logico-syntactic factors that Hunter (1957)$ for
example, isolated in adult verbal reasoning tasks appear to consist¬
ently produce the predicted effects in four- and five-year-old children.
That is, subjects in Experiment 2 who were given heterotropically
presented tasks did not appear to suffer any disadvantage (as measured
by acquisition scores and rejection rate) over subjects in Experiment 1
who were given isotropic presentation of the information. That this is
a general feature of "concrete" solutions is suggested by a study
carried out by Click and .rapner (1968) who, using subjects ranging in
age from seven to eighteen years, found that in "concrete" tests of
transitivity using e.g. dolls as stimuli, "there is virtually no
difference between the heterotropic and isotropic forms of the ooncrete
test, but that performance in the verbal test is markedly better in the
isotropic condition". ."Furthermore, apart from the failure to demon¬
strate verbal reasoning at all in young children, the results of
Experiment 2 indicate that their grasp of verbal relational terms is
too limited even to permit elementary "reversibility" (fiaget, 1964)
as shown by their failure to recover "reciprocal" information.
Secondly, the linguistio or purely lexical effects indicated by
Clark (1969» a) as a significant factor in verbal reasoning tests,
show little evidence of appearing in a concrete context. Clark (1969» a,
1970) has argued that the negative or "marked" terms of an antonymous
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pair are more complex and require more operations of reference than do
unmarked terms. He demonstrated this in the context of adult verbal
reasoning tests by showing that syllogisms involving marked terms take
longer to solve than those involving only unmarked terms.
No such asymmetry (at least as far as the "pointing" data
indicate) is obvious in Experiments 3# 4 and 5+ - and evidence that
marking effects exist at all for children of this age is none too
convincing. Hie only published study++ cited by Clark (1970) which
shows ostensible evidence for marking effects in the context of a
"concrete" test given to young children is one carried out by Donaldson
and Wales (i970). These investigators looked at the pre-school child's
responses to questions involving superlative and comparative size terms.
Comprehension was measured "by the "correct" selection of one out of a
set of four stimuli. In particular, the data from the "comparative"
tests (i.e. terms suoh as those used in the above experiments) was
poor support for the existence of lexical marking effects in children.
This data is reproduced below. The figures refer to the frequency
of "correct" choices of a stimulus.
+
Nor were such effects apparent in Experiment 2.
++
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(reproduced from "On the Acquisition of some Relational Terms" in
Hayes, J.R.,Cognition and the Development of Language, 19^9, pp 235~268).
A number of factors make these results hard to evaluate. Firstly,
it can be seen that while the "biggest" stimulus is described raulti-
dimensionally by six different terms, the "smallest" (i.e. the "marked"
term) is given less emphasis by being described by only four different
terms. Secondly, it appears from the description of the experiment
(Wales and Campbell, 1970) that the "positive", unmarked terms were
emphasised further by being referred to first in every trial. Thirdly,
three of the items in the table ought to be discounted from the overall
analysis on the grounds:
a) that one of them was ambiguous (Item (7))» This item involved
showing subjects four stimuli whose height and width oovaried
inversely; and
b) that items (5) and (6) used "familiar" stimuli (pictures of men,
as distinct from the blocks and sticks used for the other items)
which may have biased the responses in favour of a more "familiar"
description.
If these three items are discounted, the asfiymmetiy in the responses
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can be seen to be very slight: 56 correct "marked" responses as
opposed to 60 correct "unmarked" responses. These comments apart,
Wales and Campbell (1970) themselves point out: "A number of design
factors complicate the interpretation of the results of this test."
Overall, therefore, this study appears to provide slender evidence
for "marking" effects in young children.
In summary, therefore, the balance of evidence reported both
here and elsewhere seems to support the distinctions made by several
investigators concerning different "levels" of psychological operation.
As Gliok and Wapner (1968) point out:
"Whether phrased in terms of the relation between the
"perceptual" and the "conceptual" (Werner, 1940, 1957)»
the "iconic" and the "symbolic" (Bruner, 1966) or the
"concrete" and the "formal" (Inhelder and Piaget, 1964),
it is generally conceded that there are structural
differences between the two types of thought and that
they appear at different points in development."
There must now be serious doubt as to whether the version of the
five-term series as adapted by Bryant and Trabasso (1971) taps symbolic
meohanisms at all. Certainly it can be said that cues of a non-symbolic
origin feature in the training context. There are almost certainly
spatial cues at work and the "accidental" effects of serial learning
cannot be discounted either. One additional factor which now appears
to be highly significant is the feedback variable, Whereas in Bryant
and Trabasso's 1971 study it was olaimed that absence of feedbaok made
no difference to performance of four- and five-year-olds (Bryant and
Trabasso, 1971, Experiment 2), a more recent study, using the same
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paradigm, (Riley and Trabasso, 1974-) has led to a quite different
conclusion: "The relatively poorer performance has consistently been
in those conditions isfeere feedback is only linguistic." (Trabasso, 1975)
Concrete feedback, therefore, appears to be a major factor and, as the
results of Experiment 3» reported above, show, four-year-olds can
"internalise" such information extremely effectively.
In the next section of the thesis, therefore, new attempts are
described to establish strongly transitive choice profiles under condi¬
tions of distinctive and immediate sensory feedback.
CHAPTER FOUR
Although Bryant and Trabasso (1971) imply that feedback, when it
ia both verbal and sensory is equivalent in produoing a transitive
choice profile, the subsequent findings of Trabasso and his co-workers
suggest to the contrary# Riley and Trabasso (1974) found weaker trans¬
itivity in a group of subjects trained without benefit of immediate
visual feedback and this finding has been extended and amplified by
Trabasso (1975) who compared four groups (linguistic feedback with no
spatial aid; linguistic feedback with spatial aid; visual feedback with
no spatial aid; visual feedback with spatial aid) and found that presence
of sensory feedback was the most critical factor in successful training.
However, Trabasso et al, in demonstrating the importance of sensory
feedback, have seemingly reduced the transitivity "phenomenon" in young
children to something quite trivial. For, as the results reported in
Chapter Three show, four-year-olds can "place" individual sizes in a
series even under successive conditions of test. Thus subjects given
exposure (albeit serially) to all (five) physical values of the series
may have been able to "read" these values off with respect to some
simple "ioonio" representation of them. And this representation would
demand neither "integration" of pairwise information into a linear
series (as Trabasso, 1975* would suggest) nor oo-ordination of the
crucial premises at the time of tests of transitivity*
Hie possibility remains, however, that suoh feedback may only be
necessary to instill into young subjects, some adequate comprehension
of the relationships contained within the pairs without requiring
ooaplete sensory knowledge of the series as a whole; i.e. if the seme
(two) physical values were used repeatedly to provide feedback within
each training pair such that no one stimulus came to be uniquely
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identified with a particular physical value, would choices he transitive
under these conditions? If they were, then such transitivity as may
he found could not he due to any "direct" memory of the physical values
used in the feedback condition.




The subjects were 20 schoolchildren (10 boys and 10 girls) with
a mean age of 6.5 and a range of 5»3 to 6.8.
STIMULI AND APPARATUS
Subjects were trained and tested in a W.G.T.A. The stimuli were
painted tobacco tins of diameter 7 cms. and height 2.75 cms. "Heavy"
tins were filled with lead shot, "Light" tins were empty. Five
coloured wooden trays (27 cms. x 15 cms.) were used for displaying
the stimuli. These were green, red, yellow, white and blue.
DESIGN
The subjects were divided into a Verbal group and a Non-Verbal
group. This was done to permit an evaluation of the additional
encoding process which might be expected to occur in the Verbal condi¬
tion, when sensory feedbaok is translated into verbal labels. Feed¬
back was provided by weight differences between the stimuli used in
training. However, only two weight values were used. Weight was
selected to provide feedbaok that was immediate and easily sensed by
the subject. Tbrthermore, weight can be referred to without subjects
expecting to see actual weight differences. (This overcomes a problem
encountered in the course of Experiment 1.)
The main features of the design are depicted in Table 25 (over).
PROCEDURE
The Non-Verbal subjects were rewarded by finding a coloured
counter in a cavity under the appropriate tin. They were enoouraged
to collect as many of these counters as possible, which were then
placed in a glass jar beside the subjeot.
+
The details of the entire Non-Verbal trial by trial procedure are
given in Experiment pp 118/119.
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A B B C C D D E
Pair 1 2 3 4
Weight (5 SubJ"ote) L H L H L H L H
0rd,r (5 subject.) H L H L H L H L
Colour* e.g. Y B B R R W W G
Rewarded




A B B C C D D E
Pair 1 2 3 4
Weight <5 SUbJ,0t,) L H L H L H L H
0rd,r (5 Subject.) H L H L H L H L
Colaur+e.g. W R R G G B B Y
Question asked Which L? Which L? •Yhioh L? Whioh L?
Which H? Which H? Which H? Whioh H?
L « Light. H b Heavy. Y » Yellow. B s Blue. R b Red. 1 ST » White.
G = Green.
+
Colour was counterbalanced according to a Latin Square Design.
The Verbal subjects wore asked either "Which is the light one?"
or "which is the heavy one?" on any one trial. Both types of question
were asked for all four pairs. Heavy/light questions were counter¬
balanced across trials. After each question the tray was pushed forward
and the subject was asked to piok up the named tin and see if he was
right.
Correction trials were given for both Verbal and Non-Verbal
subjects.
Subjects were randomly assigned to one series of colour pairings
(see Table 25) and one of the five trays. Subjects were trained in
the following way.
Phase I
Subjects were trained to a performance criterion of 9/10 correct
on each pair in serial order from Pair 1 to Pair 4. Subjects were
rejected if they required more than 30 trials on any one pair. As each
pair was introduced, both Verbal and Kon-Verbal subjects were asked
the following questions:
"What are those?"
"What colours are they?"
"Pick them up. Bo they feel the same?"
(If, "no") "Why not?"
Subjeots who could not name all the colours oorrectly or who could not
feel any difference between the tins were rejected.
Phase II
Subjects were given "runs" which consisted of four trials on each
pair in serial order from Pair 1 to Pair 4* This continued until a
performance criterion was reached of two successive runs correct
(i.e. 32 trials). Subjeots were rejected if they required more than
200 trials to reach criterion.
Phase III
Subjects were given runs as before but th© number of trials per
pair was reduced to two. Subjects were rejected if they required more
than 200 trials.
Phase IV
Subjects were given six runs of one trial per pair.
Phase V
Subjects were given runs consisting of one trial per pair in
random order. They were required to reach a performance criterion of
six successive runs correct (24 trials). Subjects were rejected if
they required more than 200 trials to reaoh criterion.
Right-left location of the tins was randomly varied across trials.
Approximately 25 trials were given per session and sessions were run as
far as possible on conseoutive days.
Testing
Subjects' performance on the random pairs was maintained at at
least 90$ correct on each pair over a given session. The "critioal"
test pair BD was randomly embedded amongst the training pairs not more
than twice per session. Non-Verbal subjects were given no differen¬
tial reward, i.e. tins were either both heavy or both light in accord¬
ance with the subject's previous training. Responses to both stimuli
were rewarded. Verbal subjects were given no feedback on test items.
Six test trials were given for eaoh pair. For Verbal subjects the
type of question asked was randomised aoross trials with the constraint
that three trials for any test item involved the question "which is
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the light one?" and three trials involved the question "Which is the
heavy one?".
Trial times were recorded during the testing phase of the
experiment by means of a signal generator (played into a tape recorder)
which the experimenter activated by pressing a small hand-button. A
tidal was considered to commence when the door of the W.G.T.A. was
fully uplifted and was considered to end immediately after the subject
had made his response. The times were subsequently measured by a
reaction time device.
AIDS TO TRAINING-
Shortly after commencement of the experiment, the proportion of
rejected to successful subjects led to a rather pessimistic view of
the child's ability to succeed on this task. It was decided therefore
to provide additional aids in training based on the finding that
spatial layout can enhance the performance of young children on this
type of task (Riley and Trabasso, 1974). It was deoided to create a
situation where spatial separation of the pairs may reduoe proaotive
interference across pairs but where no correct solution was possible
on the basis of the layout alone (see e.g. The Bryant and Trabasso
"box" artefact).
A long stimulus tray was introduced with two reward cavities
placed at either end (see Figure 9).
FIGURE 9.
C C 0 O
Reward
Cavities Cavities
for pairs for pairs
AB and BC and DE
CD
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Subjects were transferred to the long tray if they failed to meet
criterion at some point (hiring training on the short tray* Trans¬
ferred subjects were re-trained from Phase II and rejection criteria
were used as before. All test items were administered on the short
troys. in all, ten subjects (five from each group) required this
spatial aid in order to complete training. [Comparisons between
the results of "long tray" and "short tray" subjects are made in
the appendix. To assess the extent of a possible advantage
afforded by the long tray, "short tray" subjects were subsequently
re-trained on the long tray. The results of this re-training are




TABLE 26. Lumber of Subjects Rejected (Mean Age)
No* Tested No. Rejected
Non-Verbal 10 (6.2) 3 (6.2)
Verbal 10 (6.7) 4 (5.10)
Tour out of the seven rejected subjects failed during Phase I»
As only three out of the 27 children actually failed on the
concurrent phase of training, it seems that subjects found the training
task in the above experiment easier than in Experiments 1. and 2,
reported in Chapter Two. This was probably due to some or all of the
factors which were deliberately aimed at achieving training success.
These were: (i) higher mean age of subjects, (ii) the use of concrete
feedback, and (iii) the provision of a spatial aid.
Table 27 shows the error profile for the first and final phases
of training. Mean reaction times are shown in parenthesis for Phase V.
TABLE 27. Percentage of Total Error (Mean R.T. in M.Seos)
Phase I Phase V
AB BC CD BE AB BC CD BE
Non-Verbal 55 15 22 08 02 41 40 17
R.T. 8 — *»•» — 2480 2720 2840 2320
Verbal 29 27 29 15 04 31 59 06
R.T. 8 — .. — 3377 3882 3777 3174
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A serial position effect was observed during the final phase of
training, with more errors and longer reaction times associated with
the middle pairs (See also Riley and Trabasso, 1974, Experiment 1).
TESTING
TABLE 28. Binary Choioe Profiles for Verbal and Non-Verbal Groups
NGN-VERBAL (N=10) VERBAL (N«10)
B C D £ B C B E
A .96 .70 .57* .80 A .97 .52* .72 .77
B .98 .70 .88 B .97 .77 .75
C .98 .78 C 1.00 .87
D .98 D .98
* Non-significant on a Binomial Teat (p <0.01)
The results of both groups show a dear transitive profile overall
and significant biases are obtained on both sets of "BD" scores.
— 9& ~
DISCUSSION
Are we to assume on the basis of the above results that these
children are solving the problem by means of a deductive inference?
Certainly, the evidence is consistent with the idea that the solution
is achieved by co-ordinating two pieces of information - that, for
example, B is heavier than C, and that C is heavier than D.
There are alternative ways in which the problem might be solved,
however. One such alternative originates in the field of animal
perceptual research (McGonigle and Jones, 1975, 1577)• These investi¬
gators have produoed evidence whioh they claim substantiates the view
(e.g. of Carner, 1962, 1974) that the perception of a single stimulus
is determined either by the (stimulus) set in which it (currently)
features and/or the set from which it is presumed to come, i.e. a
set which is inferred inductively. Such a view has also received
recent support from lord and Olson (1975) who suggest that children
in the process of generating descriptive sentences learn to see objeots
in the larger context provided by their former experiences, i.e. in
terms of inferred alternatives. As these authors point out:
"It is reasonable to suggest that it is the description
of objects in terms of larger and larger sets of
inferred alternatives that gives rise to the general
coding of objects we call common names."
Applied to the problem of transitivity, suoh notions of inferred
set have led to the development of a sampling model reported by
McGonigle and Chalmers (1977)* which is radically at odds with the
*
This study is reported in the next Chapter.
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oo-ordinate theory of Bryant and Trabasso, and assumes instead that
transitive choices result from single binary decision making. The
model is desorlbed by MoGonigle and Chalmers as follows:
HA set BCD, for example, affords three subsets,
BC, CD and BD, If a deoision is based exclusively on
the interrogation of any one subset, and if we assume
(in the absence of information to the contrary) that
each subset is interrogated equally often, then it is
possible to compute the choice proportions to each of
the constituent members of the triad BCD on a given
trial. If, therefore, the probability of selecting
any one of the subsets as a basis for ohoioe is 0*33
(approximately) we can thus prediot an overall ohoioe
proportion of 0.33 in the case of C (assuming absolute
preference for C over B), D has two reference subsets,
CD and BD. In the oase of subset CD (making the same
assumptions as above) the choice proportion predicted
for D will be approximately 33^fc. In the oase of
subset BD, however, we need assume no consistent
preference for either B or D. On the 33?° of all
occasions on which these comparisons are made, the
subject may select either one equally often. In this
case, the overall probability of ohoosing D would rise
by a further (with roughly of all choices going
to B). Thus we might predict the approximate ohoioe
proportions for all three stimuli in the set BCD as
follows: B a 0.17# C a 0.33 and. D a 0.50.
- 98 -
"In a two-choice situation, of course, where B is
presented in conjunction with D, C would have to he
"inferred" as a referent (an assumption in common with
the co-ordination model, some theories of perception,
and of transitivity and a reasonable one given the
duplicate relationship of C with B and D)« In this
instance the ohoioe proportions attributable to C when
actually present will now add to the overall proportions
for D (as half of them will rule out responses to B, the
other half will confirm D directly). Thus the probab¬
ility values for BD in a two-choice situation will now
be: B a 0.17, D * 0.83.
"In the oase of comparisons involving an ©ndpoint
value, however, (either A or l), fewer subsets will be
at chance levels of choice (taking as a total population
all 10 triadic permutations of the 5 term series A, B,
C, D and E); thus the projection for the average
transitive ohoioe proportion is 0.98."
It is clear from the above that the binary sampling model makes
specific predictions conoerning the choice distributions that would
be obtained if three stimuli (for example, B, C and D) are actually
presented to the subject for choice, following establishment of strong
preferences within subsets BC and CD. In suoh triadic tests, the
binary sampling model predicts both a "reduced" transitive effect and
speoifies, in addition, the ohoioe profiles for each of the triads in
turn, contrast, no suoh predictions are afforded by the co-ordination
theory, particularly when all the relevant test items are present in
the immediate perceptual field. A direct test of these positions
made in the following experiment.
EXPERIMENT 7
SUBJECTS
The subjects were those used in Experiment 6.
STIMULI AND APPARATUS
The stimuli and apparatus were identical to those used in
Experiment 6. Additional trays (of colours red, blue, white, green
and yellow) with three (instead of two) cavities were introduced for
use with the Non-Verbal group in testing.
DESIGN
The design features of Experiment 6 were maintained.
PROCEDURE
Training
Subjects were re-trained (if re-training was necessary) to their
previous performance of at least 90? correct within a single session.
Testing
Six of the total set of ten triads were administered to subjects
across four separate sessions. These were ABC, BCD, CDE, ABD, BCE and
BDE. In the first two sessions, the triads ABC, BCD and CDE were
randomly interspersed amongst the randan "runs" of the four training
pairs, until six presentations had been given on each triad. In sessions
3 and 4, the triads ABD, BCE and BDE were administered in the same way.
The location of each stimulus in every triad was counterbalanced. For
Verbal subjeots, the type of test question asked, i.e. "Which is the
heavy one?" and "'Which is the light one?", was randomised within triads
with the constraint that three of each type of question was given for
eaoh. No differential feedback was given for the Non-Verbal group and
no feedback was given at all for the Verbal group on triadic tests.
All triads were presented on "short" trays.
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RESULTS
The results axe summarised in Table 29.
TABLE 29. Triadic Choice Profiles
Verbal
TRIADS CHOICE PROJECTION OBTAINED
(Each row based on
30 observations)
* *
ABC .00 .33 .67 .06 .51+ .1+0
BCD .17 .33 .50 .22 .19 .59
CDE .00 .33 .67 .06 .22 .72
ABD .00 .50 .50 .13 •51+ .33
BCE .00 .33 .67 .18 .23 .57
BDE .17 .17 .60 .20 .33 •1+7
Average
Distribution .06 •33 .61 f14 .31+ •52
TRIADS CHOICE PROJECTION OBTAINED
(Each row based on
30 observations)
* *
ABC .67 .33 .00 .58 .28 .11+
BCD .50 .33 .17 .58 •3k .08
CDE .67 .33 .00 .78 .15 .07
ABD .1* .w • 60 .22 .18
BCE .67 .33 .00 .57 •3k .09
BDE .50 .50 .00 .1+2 .1+8 .10
Average
Distribution .61 •33 r06 •5? .30 .11
Arrows refer to the direction of choice required by the




TRIADS CHOICE PROJECTION OBTAINED
(Each row based on
60 observations)
ABC .00 .33 .67 .08 .28 .64
BCD .17 .33 .50 .20 .23 .57
CDE .00 .33 .67 .17 .15 .68
ABD .00 .50 .50 .10 .43 .47
BCE .00 .33 .67 .03 .47 .50
BDE .17 .17 .66 .28 .20 .52
Average
Distribution .06 .11 .61 .16 .29 .67
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DISCUSSION
Triadic tests provide the basis for discrimination between what
might appear to be equally competent positions with respect to the two-
ohoice transitivity data (see Levelt, 1970). For the co-ordination
model must predict that, when confronted with the three stimuli crucial
to co-ordination in two-choice tests, i.e. BCD, the subject must now
select D with at least the same frequency as in the case of the B versus
D comparisons (where C is alleged to be first inferred inductively* and
then used in a deductive operation to produce the solution). By contrast,
the binary choice model as proposed ty MoGonigle and Chalmers (1977)
assumes that only the induotive inferential stage (to infer 'C* when
B versus D comparisons are involved) is both a necessary and sufficient
condition to guarantee a transitive solution. Given the binary assump¬
tions of this model, it is quite clear that frequency of seleoting D
will change radically from the two-choice case, B v D, to the triadic
case, B v C v D (as no co-ordination on serial choice operations are
anticipated by the model).
As the results show, the choioe profiles which emerge in the
triadic tests are fully compatible with the predictions made by this
model for each of the triads in turn.
The implications of 3U0h results are consistent moreover with
other researoh findings in a child-developmental context. In a study
by Ford and Olson (1975), for example, it was claimed that inductive
Bryant does not make this point explicit but any explanation which
would suggest that C is a deductively inferred referent would be
oiroular.
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inferences are basic to the descriptive operations of children of a
similar age to those used in the experiments described above. In
Ford and Olson's study, four-, five- and seven-year-old children were
required to describe objects varying in colour, size, shape and
decorative markings. From their investigations, Ford and Olson con¬
cluded "that children's descriptions reflect the contrasting altar-
natives in the situation as a whole, not the immediate context of
alternatives". Compatible also with the findings from Experiment 7
is Ford and Olson's observation that even when all the relevant
information is given perceptually, children cannot utilise it all to
generate exhaustive descriptions of the stimuli placed in front of
them. This deficit in the utilization of information which is 'given'
perceptually is confirmed, further, by Lunzer end Lucas (1977)•
Lunzer et al's demonstration used pictures to represent four
comparisons, A>B; B>C; C>B; B>E. The relationships depicted
were "higher" (pictured by two kites); "in front of", i.e. "winning"
(pictured by racing cars) and "heavier" (pictured by objects on see-saws).
Even with all the pictures in the field showing, e.g. "the red kite is
higher than the blue kite" and "the blue kite is higher than the green
kite", even six-year-old subjects (the youngest subjects) showed a
completely chance response to the "BB" question.
Overall, then, a consistent profile of the very young child
emerges, which reflects his inability to make extensive and concatenated
object descriptions even where retention is not a factor.
The thesis of Bryant and Trabasso offers an apparently "simple"
or simplified account of child development eschewing the complexities
inherent in, for example, Piaget's theory. However, this insistence
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that deductive inferential mechanisms are and must be implicated in
the five-tern series experiments as described by Bryant and Xrabasao
(1971) adds, in effeat, an "extra operation" to what might be already
a sufficient mechanism in the form of an inductive inference.
whatever the merits or demerits of the co-ordination model, it
would be unfair to imply here that the 1971 version was the only one
now available. ior one of the authors of that 1971 report, Tom Xrabasso,
has since developed a position along rather different lines (Xrabasso,
Kiley and Wilson, 1975# Xrabaaao and Ililey, 1975# Riley and Xrabasso,
1974; Xrabasso, 1975).
Xrabasso has likened his own model to the "image" model of
de Soto, London and Handel (1965). Xrabasso*s model states that
subjects construct linear order using an "ends-inwards" atrategy with
the linguistically unmarked end being isolated first. When the end-
anchored pairs are isolated they are entered into an imagined spatial
array, one at either end. The other pairs are then "ordered" and
entered in between the end pairs. The steps of ordered entry produces
an array ABODE, These steps constitute the encoding or storage
part of the model.
luring test questions this information in the array is "accessed"
or retrieved in the following way: each location has a "oode" for the
underlying dimensional scale (of length). Each colour name is thus
associated with a code C at each location in the array. It is the
relative strengths of these associations that determines the direction,
speed and accuracy of choices during testing. Xrabasso gives a detailed
account of how the relative strength of the association may be
mathematically derived (Xrabasso, Riley and Wilson, 1975)# e.g. by
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Lace's choice axiom (1959) or i&irdock*s theory of stimulus discrimin-
ability (Murdock, 1960). Essentially, however, the main prediction
is that speed of decision is correlated with distance on the array so
that the greater the distance between the items, the faster the
response. This is similar to Moyer's (1973) model of "internal psycho-
physics" but is, as Moyer and Bayer (1976) point out, particularly
interesting as it suggests that distance effects can be obtained by
an entirely symbolic representation.
An important implication of Trabasso's model in the context of
the current discussion is that solution does not depend on the co¬
ordination of the premises:
"We believe that, indeed, children we have studied in
these tasks do not use operational transitivity to
solve the problem if one means by that term co-ordination
of the members of the premises via a middle terra at the
time of testing." (Riley and Trabasso, 1975)
By contrast, Trabasso et al believe that the pairwise information is
integrated prior to testing into an array composed of single items.
What evidence, therefore, is advanced by these investigators in
favour of the model which they propose as an alternative to the
co-ordination model? Two main sources of evidence are cited:
a) Serial position effects in training. A demonstration of the
ends-inwards strategy is believed by Trabasso to be provided
by the serial position effects obtained in training in which
the end-pairs are learnt faster than the middle pairs. To
To show that the effeot is truly directional (ends to middle)
and not simply due to a straightforward dilferenoe between
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end-pairs and (all) middle pairs, Trabasso et al have produoed
evidence from a six-term series problem in which it was shown
that pairs (1,2) and (5,6)were learnt fastest followed by
pairs (2,3) and (4,5) with pair (3,4) the slowest. Table 30
shows a sample of evidenoe of this nature obtained by Trabasso
and his co-workers.
TABLE 30. Relative Percent Trials to Criterion
Age Pair
(1,2) (2,3) (5,4) (4,5) (5,6)
6 11 24 28 26 11
9 18 23 28 23 12
(Reproduced from Trabasso, Kiley and Alison, 1975)
b) The error and reaction-time profile in testing. Test questions
involving large distances are predicted, on the linear model, to
show fewer errors and faster reaction times than those involving
short distanoes. On the whole these predictions are confirmed
by the data of Trabasso, Riley and Y.'ilson (1975) in which test
pairs (2,4) and (3,5) are shown to produce more errors and longer
solution times than the pair (2,5) (see Figure 10, over).
A major implication of the linear model, is that single stimuli
(each represented independently on the "internal*' array through
integration of the pairwise information) ought to be judged on a
probabilistic basis in a manner whioh reflects their relative position
on that scale, i.e. for a series in which A is the "shortest" item and
E the "longest", B ought to be judged as short, C about middle, and




















NUMBER OF INFERENTIAL STEPS
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The subjects were those used In Experiments 6 and 7 (minus one
who was on holiday)*
STIMULI AND APPARATUS
The stimuli and apparatus were identical to those used in
Experiment 6*
DESIGN
Subjeots were allocated to a single Verbal group. required
re-training the Non-Verbal subjects according to the training design
of Experiment 6. A full report of this procedure together with the
transfer results is included in the appendix.*/
PROCEDURE
Training
Subjects were re-trained (if re-training was neoessazy) to a
performance of at least 90^ correct within a session.
Testing
Subjeota were shown one oolcur of tin at a time and asked on each
presentation: "What colour does that one go with?"* Each colour was
represented once in six runs of five randomly ordered presentations*
No feedback was given* This entire procedure was repeated using the
question: "Is that a heavy one or a light one?". Finally, subjects
were asked (with no stimulus in the visual field): "Which is the
heaviest tin?"* After responding, they were then asked: "Which is the
next heaviest? and so on until subjects said that they "didn't know",
or began repeating colours already given. This entire procedure was




Judgments of "heavy" and "light" are expressed as a percentage
of the total number of responses given to each stimulus. These are
tabulated separately for subjects for whom A is heavy and E is light,
and for subjects for shorn A is light and E is heavy.
A - heavy : E - light A - light s E - heavy
Judgments of "Heavy"
Stimulus: ABODE
% 90 53 50 63 15
Judgments of "Light"
Stimulus: ABODE
% 54 18 13 25 05
Judgments of "Light"
Stimulus: ABODE
% 10 47 40 37 85
Judgments of "Heavy"
Stimulus: ABODE
% 00 67 76 54 91
Table 32 shows the number of responses for the two most frequent
oolour "associations" given to each stimulus. These are expressed as









A B 87 E 07
B A 49 C 39
C B 58 D 37
D E 59 C 29
E D 90 C 04
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Table 33 shows the "seriatians" produced by eaoh subject.
TABLE 33
Question:
"Which is the heaviest/
next heaviest", etc.
"Whioh is the lighest/
next lightest", etc.
Subject For Series: A B C D E For Series: E D C B A
1 B D A C E D C B
2 B E C B D
3 A B E D D C B
4 A C D B E
5
6 C E
7 B C D A E C B D E A
8 C B C E D D B C E
9 A E D B C E D B C
10 A B C D E D C
For Series: E D C B A For Series: A B C D E
11 E D C B A A B C D
12 E D C C A B A
13 E A c B A
14 E D c B A A D B C B
15 E C B D A A B C D E
16 B E A D C
17 E C B D B D B
18 A B D C
19 A D E B C
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DISCUSSION
As it will be seen from Tables 31 32, the results of
Experiment 8 do not readily lend themselves to the support of Trabasso's
claim that pairwise information is integrated into a "new" linear
representation on whioh each item is "scaled" with respect to the others.
For there is no evidence that the probability of labelling a single
stimulus as "heavy" or "light" reflects the relative position of that
stimulus in the series as a whole. Only the end-points attract a stable
and consistent "label". For the rest, the absence of any comparison
stimulus leads to a labile and "fluctuating" judgment on the part of
the subject. It can be seen from Table 32, furthermore, that subjects
show signs of maintaining strong pairwise associations, with the end-
pairs showing greater assooiatlve strengths than do the middle ones.+
Perhaps the strongest implication of the linear model is that
subjects who show transitive choices, should also be able to "seriate"
each of the items used in training. As Trabasso and Riley (1975) point
out:
" "Our findings indioete that seriation, i.e. the
creation of a linear order, is critioal to making
inferences or at least performing well on inference
tests."
The "stronger" associations of B and D to the "ends" A and E than
to the "middle", C, does not violate the assumption of the binary
choice model which stipulates that when both B and D are present,
then C will be inferred. This point will be returned to in
Chapter Five.
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Table 33 shows, however, that, despite their strongly transitive
choice profile, subjects in the above experiment could not fully
seriate the items when asked to do so. For no subject seriated per¬
fectly in both directions and only three out of the nineteen seriated
perfeotly in one direction.
Overall, then, the evidence for "linearity" is poor. Instead,
the most significant feature of the results is the prominence given to
end-points as indicated by e.g. the stability of their "labels", and
their high levels of associativity. "Prominence" of end-points also
features in the actjiisition and retention data, (see Experiment 7
which shows strong serial position effects by the end of training,
with the end-pairs appearing to be easier to learn and to retain than
the middle ones). Rather than claim, therefore, as do Trabasao, Riley
and .Vilson (1975) that such effects are "prima facie evidence for the
construction or use of an underlying linear ordering of events", it
is argued here that suoh effects reflect simply an asymmetry in the
"accessibility" of the training pairs and/or individual members of
those pairs.
This end-point prominence raises the spectre, moreover, of a
possible artefact in Trabasso's demonstrations of the "distance effeot".
For his experiments involve a basic confounding of the distance of test
items from the end-points of the series, with the distance of test items
from each other. That is, experimental manipulation of "distance" as
a variable, within a single group of subjects must inevitably produce,
feu* every increase in "distance" between test pairs, a corresponding
deorease in the distance of those items from their end-points. In order
to estimate the effects of "distance" per se, therefore, it is neoessary
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to compare two independent groups of subjects, each of whom learns a
series of a different length. This would allow the experimenter to
vary the number of inferential steps "expunged" in the tests of trans¬
itivity whilst keeping constant the distance of the test items from
their end-points.
iJven conceding, for a moment, that the introduction of t ich
"controls" would leave Trabasso's claim unaffected, a further possibi¬
lity still remains that the "linearity" of any representation is a
direct product of "feedback". This effect could be achieved through
"Jnternalisation" of the actual physical values shown to subjects after
each response. That such an operation is feasible has been demonstrated
in Chapter Three. It ha3 also been demonstrated for adults by Koyor
(1973)* If this possibility is correct, it would make redundant
Trabasso's claim that the linear nature of the series representation
is a direct consequence of the way subjects "integrate" relational
information given verbally. And this possibility is in fact given
further credibility by the finding of Trabasso, Ililey and Wilson (1975)
that young subjects of six years of age showed no "distance effects"
when information was presented in a purely verbal form (see Figure 10,
p.116, Condition L - 6).+
+
hoyer and Bayer (1976) also draw attention to Trabaaso's failure
to obtain distance effects in their youngest group, using the
linguistic condition. iloyer and Bayer axe apparently puzzled as
to why "symbolic" distance effects did not obtain in thi3 group.
Evidence reported in the Appendix, however, confirms the view that
in the feedback conditions, the effects axe not "symbolic" at all,
but axe based on sense-data. For example, the Non-Verbal group
showed a better transfer performance to the Verbal condition on
the direction specified by their previous training than they did
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In any event, the main findings reported in this chapter can be
summarised as follows:
a) Transitive choice profiles are produced by young children in
verbal and non-verbal tests when strong and immediate feedback
is given after each response.
b) Training produces, as an "accidental" result, an asymmetry of
access amongst the pairs with the end-pairs being more access¬
ible than the middle pairs.
c) transitive choices can be predicted by the binary sampling
model of McGonigle and Chalmers (1977) which exploits such
asymmetry of access.
Contrary to Trabasso*s claim, therefore, that transitive responses
are a product of a linear representation of the training series, it is
the view expressed here that transitive choices may be "induced" through
the asymmetry of series representation which is essentially pairwise.
On this view notiling more is demanded than the operation of mechanisms
of induction found routinely in many spheres of perceptual inquiry, •
including those involving non-human subjects (see McGonigle and Jones,
1975, 1977a).
If inductive mechanisms are abroad therefore in the perceptual
transaction by non-humans and if such inferences can underwrite
on the other direction. The performance on the "novel" direction
during triadic tests was erratic and showed an average deviation
from the predictions derived from the binary sampling model of
MoGonigle and Chalmers (1977) of: .16 .12 .13 (on each column
respectively), while the deviation on the "original" direction was:
.06 .06 .08. In general, the effect of "sensed" direction was
for more profound than pure lexical affects as could be seen from
the relative difficulty experienced by Verbal subjects when given
the series A B C D E. This difficulty appeared to be entirely
due to the use of a transition which, in concrete functional terms,
seemed to be an "unnatural" one for subjects. (The full details
of these results are reported in the Appendix.)
- 117 -
transitive choice behaviour (at least under the conditions of test
described here), it follows that e.g. squirrel monkqys, exposed to
similar conditions of test, will show an equally transitive profile.
In the next chapter experiments are described which test this
prediction.
CHAPTER FIVE
That perceptual operations implicate inductive mechanisms was
first proposed, by Helmholtz (1925)*
"Inasmuch as in an overwhelming majority of cases,
whenever the parts of the retina in the outer corner of
the eye are stimulated, it has been found, to be due to
external light coming into the eye from the direction of
the bridge of the nose, the inference we make is that it
is so in every new case whenever this part of the retina
is stimulated; just as we assert that every single
individual now living will die, beoause all previous
experience has shown that all men who were formerly alive
have died." (1925, Vol. Ill, p 5)
This historical influence of prior stimulation on perceptual judgment
has been emphasized since by many major perceptual theorists, e.g.
Brunswiok (1955), Kilpatrick (1954), Ittleson (1962), Bruner (see Bruner,
Goodnow and Austin, 1966), Gregory (1970)•
For Bruner (1957) an inductive inference implies "going beyond
the information given", and is found in its most primitive form in
routine acts of classification. Bruner (1966) writes:
"Categorizing an event as a member of a class and
thereby giving it identity involves, as we have said, an
act of inference. Whether one is deciding what the blob
was that appeared for a few milliseconds in a tachisto-
scope or what species of bird it is that we have our
binoculars trained on or what Pueblo period this potsherd
belongs to, the basic task is .... to make an inference."
(1966, p 17)
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These examples should not be taken to imply, however, that it is
only the case of the degraded stimulus or a stimulus viewed under
restricted conditions, that invites acts of reconstruction based on
inferential mechanisms. On the contrary, Garner (1962, 1974) has shown
that for perception of any stimulus to be adequate (however clearly and
sharply depicted in purely sensory terms), it must be referred to some
larger population or set of stimuli from which it is presumed to come.
Garner (1966) states:
"How the single stimulus is perceived is a function
not so muoh of what it is, but is rather a function of
what the total set and the subset are. The properties of
the total set and the subset are also the perceived
properties of the single stimulus, so we cannot understand
the knowing of the single stimulus without understanding
the properties of the sets within which it is oontained."
(1966)
A demonstration of this principle has been provided by Bruner and
Minturn (1955) in which an "expectancy" based on prior exposure to a
set of stimuli radically altered the perception of one presented
subsequently, e.g. a stimulus was seen as a "13" when numbers were
expected; on other occasions it was judged as a "B" when letters were
expected.
Such demonstrations have normally been confined to studies with
human subjects. However, McGonigle and Jones (1975* 197fe) have recently
reported similar experiments on rats and squirrel monkeys. In their
experiment, monkeys, for example, were found to polarise linear dot
patterns (i.e. organise them into rows and oolumns) only when oertain
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contrastives were present in the immediate visual field. Thus, a
symmetrical dot matrix when paired with an asymmetrical one, allowed
for polarisation of the latter, whilst no such polarisation of the
asymmetrical matrix occurred when it was paired with a stimulus of
plain homogeneous surface.
These findings are considered by McGonigle and Jones (1975) to
confirm Garner's position expressed by him as follows:
"What this result shows is that the immediately
presented subset of two stimuli, determines the
perceived properties of the stimuli in it, and the
perceived properties of any single stimulus change as
that stimulus is variously paired with other stimuli,
since the dimension which meaningfully differentiates
a pair of stimuli depends on a particular pair of
stimuli involved." (1974, p 10)
In a reply to criticism from Dodwell (1977), McGonigle and Jones (1977a)
have elaborated this position further to stress the implications of
the criteria of judgment in visual organisation and retention by the
perceiver. On this view such criteria are suggested to the naive
peroeiver in the first instance by the contrastives in the immediate
perceptual field. Later, those contrastives previously associated with
the stimulus (to be judged) are used as a source of reference from which
the criteria of judgment may be derived.
The main implication of this view for the "five-term series" is
that monkeys should learn its "connecting pairs" easily enough. *or
such learning depends on these very operations of comparison and
contrast which McGonigle and Jones claim to be endemic to stimulus
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interrogation and representation by monkey. Coupled moreover with
the claim expressed in Chapter Four that inductive mechanisms are
sufficient in themselves to solve the "deduotive" tests (of this
series), the conclusion now seems inescapable that the squirrel monkey
will also demonstrate a transitive choice profile in tests similar to
those carried out with children.
Note
This experiment is one in which I collaborated and for whioh I
did some of the testing. It was initiated and carried out in the main




The subjects were eight adult male squirrel monkeys. They had
extensive test experience (Mc&onigle and Jones, 1975» 1977 a, b) but
no prior history of colour or weight discrimination training.
STIMULI AND APPARATUS
Subjects were trained and tested in a W.G.T.A. The training
stimuli and the trays on which they were presented were identical to
those described in Experiment 6 (p. 88).
DESIGN
The main features of the design are depicted in Table 34.
TABLE 34. Spheme of Training Paradigm
Series
Identification
A B B C C D D E
Pair 1 2 3 4
Weight (4 Subjects) L H L H L H L H
Order (4 Subjects) H L H L H L H L
Colour+ e.g. Y B B R R W W G
Rewarded Stimulus e.g. B R w G
L = Light . H a Heavy. Y = Yellow. B = Blue. R « Red. W « White.
G = Green.
+ Colour was counterbalanced according to a Latin Square Design.
PROCEDURE
Subjects were randomly assigned to one series of colour pairings
(see Table 34) and one of the five trays. They were trained on each
pair in the following way: a pair of tins was placed on the tray,
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each tin oovering one of the two foodwells. Choioe of one of the tins
was rewarded with a peanut located in one of two foodwells directly
underneath the stimuli. To indicate choice and secure the reward, the
monkey had to manually displace the appropriate tin from its position
over the foodwell. After an error, however, the monkey received no
reward; the tray was withdrawn in full view of the subject for 5 seoonds
and a screen was then lowered to permit the experimenter to replace the
stimulus unseen and restart testing. Training was conducted in
different phases. These were as follows:
Phase I
Monkeys were trained to a performance of 9/10 correct on each
pair in serial order from Pair 1 to Pair 4. This was repeated onoe.
Phase II
Pairs were presented in "runs" of a fixed number of trials per
pair in serial order from Pair 1 to Pair 4. Five nine of 10 trials
were given followed by five runs of five trials.
Phase III
Subjects were given five runs of one trial per pair.
Phase IV
Subjects were given runs of the four pairs, consisting of one
trial per pair in random order. They were required to reach a perfor¬
mance criterion of 22 out of 24 trials correct.
Right-left looation of the tins was randomly varied across trials.
Approximately 50 trials were given per session and sessions were run,
as far as possible, on consecutive days.
Testing
Subjects' performance on the random pairs was maintained at at
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least 90% correct on each pair over a given session. The "critical"
test pair BD was embedded at random amongst the training pairs for
not more than two trials per session. 13o differential feedback was
given on this test pair and testing continued until 10 suoh trials
had been administered. Left-right positions were oounterbalanced
across test pairs.
The five remaining binary test pairs AC, AD, AE, BE and CE were
then administered. These were embedded at random amongst "runs" of
the four training pairs; a procedure which continued until each test
pair had been presented 10 times. The position of the tins was counter¬
balanced. within each test series. During these tests, no differential
feedback was given, i.e. the stimuli were both heavy or both light
according to the previous training history of the subject. All ohoioes
were rewarded.
In the final phase of testing subjects were presented with each
of the 10 triplets derived from all possible triadio combinations of
the five stimuli in the original set. Five new trays, each with three
foodwells, were introduced. Each session began with 25 trials involv¬
ing the original training pairs presented in random runs. If not more
than two errors were recorded, monkeys were then presented with each
of the 10 triads, presented in counterbalanced order, for the next
25 trials. The position of eaoh stimulus on the tray was also counter¬
balanced. No differential feedbaok was given during trladic testa.




All but one monkey learnt the series. The following results are
reported for the remaining seven.
Table 35 shows the acquisition scores for the first and final
stages of training. These show a strong serial position effect by
Phase V.
TABLE 35. Percentage of Total Error
Phase I Phase V
AB BC CD BE AB BC CD DE
25 32 20 23 09 28 51 12
Table 36 shows the binary choioe profile obtained by subjects in
tests of transitivity. On the crucial BD comparisons, the choices are
significantly transitive.
TABLE 56.
B C D E
A .98 1.00 1.00 1.00
B • vx> .90 .76
C ONCO« .87
D .97
All choices were significant on a
Binomial Test (pCO.Ql)
12*6 -
Table 37 shows the two-choice profile obtained by each individual
subject. This demonstrates that transitive choice scores are obtained
from all but one monkey (Green H+).
TABLE 37. Frequency of Choices to each Test Pair
A E A c A D c E B E B D
Bill L+ 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 1 9 0 10
Bump Irt- 0 10 0 10 0 10 1 9 1 9 0 10
Brown L+ 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 1 9 0 10
Broken Finger L+ 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 1 9 0 10
Blue H+ 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10
Yellow H+ 0 10 0 10 0 10 6 4 5 5 1 9
Green H+ 0 10 0 10 0 10 2 8 9 1 6 4
Total 0 70 0 70 0 70 9 61 17 53 7 63
Table 38 (over) shows the triadio ohoioe profile compared with
the choice projections made by the binary sampling of McGonigle and
Chalmers (1977).
Table 39 (p 128) shows the three-choice profile obtained by each
subject. It is interesting to note that the only monkey whose choices
are markedly Intransitive during this Phase (Green H+) is also intrans¬
itive during the two-ohoice tests.
Table 40 (p 129) shows the overall frequency to each triad and
the sum of frequencies to individual items. This provides for a global
impression of the choice transitivity within the series as a whole.
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TABLE 58
TRIAD CHOICE PROJECTION OBTAINED
(Each row is based
on 70 observations)
ABC .00 .33 .67 .00 .31 .69
BCD .17 .33 .50 .03 .36 .61
CDE .00 .33 .67 .11 .24 .65
ABD .00 .50 .50 .00 .44 .56
ABE .00 .33 .67 .00 .30 .70
ACD .00 .33 .67 .00 .30 .70
ACE .00 .33 .67 .00 .26 .74
ADE .00 .33 .67 .01 .21 .78
BCE .00 .33 .67 .06 .28 .66
BDE .17 .17 .66 .16 .24 .60
Average

































































































































































































































































































TABLE 40. Frequenoy of Choice to each Triad
TRIAD A B c D E
ABC 0 22 48
BCD 2 25 43
BDE 11 17 42
CDE 8 17 45
BCE 4 20 48
ABD 0 31 39
ACD 0 21 49
ADE 1 15 54
ABE 0 21 49
ACE 0 18 52
TOTAL 1 91 140 180 288
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DISCUSSION
The above results show that even squirrel monkeys (whose learning
skills have been described by Dodwell, 1977, as little better than those
of a rati) show a transitive choice profile following training on the
five-term series. Their performance is, moreover, similar in all
essential details to the performance of children in the experiments
reported here as well as those of Trabasso and his co-workers (see
Trabasso, 1975). For, like children, the monkeys showed serial position
effects in acquisition, strong end-point effect and high retention scores.
It can be seen, furthermore, that there is a direct relationship between
the patterns of choice in the binary and triadic phases of testing even
when protocols for individual subjects are examined,+ This concordance
between the two and the three-choice profiles would militate against any
suggestion that the two types of test are tapping different and quite
independent processes.
Nevertheless, the transitivity of choice observed in these subjects
may be explained along lines quite different to those put forward by
Bryant and Trabasso (1971)• For a reduced transitive effect is observed
in the three-choice case and, overall, the results can be handled by the
simple binary model outlined in Chapter Four. A number of factors lend
support, furthermore, to the view that the fit with the sampling model
is not merely "accidental". Firstly, it can be seen that apart from
one "intransitive" subject, the triadic profiles of individual subjects are
all concordant with the prediction that the transitive choice bias on
+
It is particularly interesting to note that subject Green, the only
"intransitive" subject, also s lowed a deviant profile during triadic
tests.
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e.g. the BD comparison, is more pronounced than in the three-choice
comparison BCD. Secondly, the fit with the choice projection for each
triad can be seen to be a good one - even where the prediction was
somewhat unexpected as in the case of ABD. Thirdly, the main assumption
on which the model itself is based (that in the case of the BD comparison,
C will be inferred as a referent) is supported by evidence that B and D
are each "closer" to C than they are to their respective end-points.
Support for this comes from the serial position effects in acquisition
ifhich suggest that B and C, and C and D are more "confusable" than are
A and B, or D and S. If, as Trabasso, Riley and Wilson (1975) suggest,
we can convert relative "discriminability" into distance information,
then the inference is feasible that B and D are "closer" to C than they
are to A and E (respectively). Further evidence on this point comes from
the apparent distances between individual item3 when the frequencies of
response attachments to each item are summed across triads (see Table 40
on page 129). These frequencies show a "distance" between A and B and
between D and E which, in both cases, is greater than the total distance
between B and C, and C and D; again suggesting a primacy of "access" for
C over A or E.
A final source of evidence justifying this core assumption of the
binary sampling model comes from the single stimulus data from Experiment
8 reported in Chapter Four (see Table 32 on page 111). From this data,
the .joint associative strength of B and D with C can be computed by adding+
the probability of associating C when B is the prime to the probability of
associating C if D is the prime. This produces a joint associative proba-
+
This is done by adding the first probability (.29) to the second -
expressed as a proportion of the residual uncertainty (.39x.71).
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bility of B and D to C of .57 - a figure reasonably close to the .66
probability assumed in the model.
Whatever the fit of the model to the data, the binary sampling
model is nevertheless open to the objection that little or no a priori
justification is given for the assumption that only BC and CD are
"accessed" when B and D are present. Such an objection has been raised
by Lunzer (personal communication) in the form of the query! "Why a
zero probability should attach to the comparisons AB and DE?". This
query can be catered for, however, by calculations involving extended
versions of the model. From these it can be seen that the fit with the
data is, an important criterion for assessing the viability of the
assumptions of the model, for many plausible versions may be generated
whose predictions do not match the empirical outcome. Take, for example,
a simple version of the model which assumes in the case of the BD compari¬
son, that both the subsets to which B and D belong have an equal proba¬
bility of being sampled. In such a case it would be predicted that on
25% of all occasions A will be implicated by B's presence and that, like¬
wise, C will be implicated on another 25% (assuming that B and D are
sampled equally often). Similarly, E will be evoked by D for the
remaining 25% of the time. The clear effect of such "democracy" of
access would be a "cancelling out" of AB*s contribution to the choice
distribution on BD by BC's contribution, and, likewise, a "cancelling
out" of CD by DE, thus resulting in no transitive bias whatever. On the
other hand, a quite different result is predicted if the assumption is
made that, whatever stimulus is responsible for evoking them, the end-
points A and E will affect both stimuli in the field. Thus on the 25%
of all occasions that A is accessed it will have no measurable effect
on the overall bias as it will confirm both B and D. Similarly, when
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E is accessed by D it will disconfirm both B and D. By contrast, when
C is accessed it will have an asymmetrical effect on B and D; disconfinn¬
ing B and confirming D directly. This version of the model would result
in a completely transitive response on 50p of all occasions and a "chance"
response on the remaining 50;% of all occasions, resulting in an overall
transitive response to BD of 75/^,
Yet another variation of the model can be produced by assuming that
the end-points are best represented and thus easier to access, and also
that the influence of the end-points is'generalised" (see Spence, 1937,b)+.
Thus, in the case of the BD comparison, where A i3 accessed (pair AB),
D cannot be located between A and B and will therefore be seen to lie
further away from the anchor, A which, in the case of the non-verbal
condition, is the only stimulus which must be avoided consistently, D
i3 thus selected by elimination. In the case of BD, where E is accessed
A model, not unlike the one proposed here has been suggested by
de Boysson-Bardies and 0'Regan (1973), These authors propose that a
labelling-by-proximity strategy accounts for the transitive bias
shown by children in the five-term series problem. That is, B
"acquires" the label of A and for D "acquires" the label of E by
virtue of the fact that whilst A and E have clear and consistent
labels attaching to them, B and D are mere "nonentities". However,
these authors produce no direct test of their hypothesis, i.e. by
simply asking subjects to label individual stimuli following
training on the four pairs. Simple "labelling" is thus only one out
of the many possible alterations, and is, in fact, one which gains
little support from the evidence reported here (see Chapters Two and
Four),
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(pair DE), B cannot be located between E and D and is therefore seen
to lie outside this subset. D is thus chosen as the stimulus closest
(by association) to the end-anchor E, the only stimulus to be rewarded
consistontly in the case of the non-verbal condition. By simple extension
to verbal labels, this account is equally applicable in the verbal
condition. The net result of this model would be complete, 100/v
transitivity.
The above variations of the model provide by no means an exhaustive
set of all possible variations. Other versions can be generated by
different combinations of 3ome of those already mentioned, or even on
the basis of various "conditional" models but it is not the purpose of
the present account to provide an exhaustive list of all possible varia¬
tions. Instead it is sufficient to point out that :
(a) the "fit" provided by the binary model as it stands is
not an inevitable outcome which would be produced by any
number of alternatives.
(b) the binary model can encompass a number of "extensions"
which have little or no material effect on the choice
predictions.
(c) there are sufficient variations to account for any
differences observed between different groups of subjects
(children, for example, appear to show a less marked
transitive bias than do the monkeys).
Rather than conclude, therefore, like Lutkus and Trabasso (1974)
that Bryant and Trabasso's experiment was "designed .... in such a way
that success on the BD pair (the "symptom response") could be explained
in no other way than by a transitive inference", it is suggested, instead,
that the solution of the five-term series tests is open to a variety of
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alternative interpretations. Those considered here are basically
"associative" models of thinking where an "inference" (in this context)
is regarded as an act of recovery or, in Hebb's terms "a reconstruction
on the basis of experience" (1949» p.47) and not as the production of
"new" information. This distinction has been put succinctly by James
(1891):
"The great difference, in fact, betx^een that simpler kind of
rational thinking which consists in the concrete objects of
past experience merely suggesting each other, and reasoning
distinctively so called, i3 this that whilst the empirical
thinking is only reproductive, reasoning is productive. An
empirical or "rule-of-thumb" thinker can deduce nothing from
the data with whose behaviour and associates he is unfamiliar.
But put a reasoner amongst a set of concrete objects which he
has neither seen nor heard of before, and with little time, he
will make such inferences from them as will quite atone for
his ignorance" (1891, page 329/330).
Thus it is the thesis presented here that the five-term series, as
exploited by Bryant and Trabasso (1971) monitors some kind of association
ability - not the capacity to reason deductively.
CHAPTER SIX
It is plain that the evidence reported in the previous chapters
lends little support for the view that children can "reason distinctively".
For, as James (1891) points out, the hallmark of such thought is that :
"A thing inferred by reasoning need neither have been
an habitual associate of the datum from which we infer
it, nor need it be similar to it. It may be a thing
entirely unknown to our previous experience something
which no simple association of concretes could ever have
evoked." (1891, p.329).
By contrast, transitive solutions produced by four to 3ix-year-old
children and squirrel monkeys can be interpreted readily enough as the
product of previous and indeed very specially cultivated experience -
an experience geared to produce the habitual association of which James
speaks. Certainly the critical transitive solutions reported here show
no ostensible sign of the "production" of novel information which would
satisfy James's criterion for reasoning outlined above for (endemic to
this sort of task) the response set from which the subject must respond on
crucial tests is (a) provided by the experimenter, e.g. "which is taller?",
"which is heavier?", etc., and (b) is cultivated during original training
until the subject is "word perfect". Evidence of productive thinking must
therefore be inferred from the manifestation of the "correct" (rather
than the "novel") answer. However, no verification procedures are adopted
to determine what steps (if any) are taken by the subject to arrive at the
conclusion he reports, a conclusion which although "correct" may, as
Bergmann (1957) and Cohen and Nagel (1934) have pointed out, be drawn
from false premises. Unless and until such steps are carried out, the
"correctness" of an answer under circumstances similar to those described
in the majority of experiments reported in this thesis, may be reasonably
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interpreted as the product of operations of "ihference" akin to those
which Hebb (1949) describes as fundamental to perceptual behaviour !
"A drawing or a report of what is seen tachistoscopically is not
unlike a paleontologist's reconstruction of early man from a
tooth and a rib. There is a clear effect of earlier experience
filling in gaps in the actual perception, so that the end-
result is either something familiar or a combination of familiar
things - a reconstruction on the basis of experience." (1949,p.47).
It is in this sense then that "inferences" made by four to six-year-
old children and squirrel monkeys are conceived of here: as essentially
inductive and not as the product of formal deductive thinking. This is
not to imply however, that any inductive "logic" is considered to be the
"poor relation" of a deductive one. On the contrary, as the nineteenth
century philosopher, J.S. Mill has pointed out, many inductive operations
are more "truly" inferential than the so-called "strong" deductive ones.
Passmore (1968) has summarised Mill's position as : (the need)
"... to distinguish between "real" inferences and "merely verbal"
transformations. Such a transition as that from %jome sovereigns
are tyrants' to 'some tyrants are sovereigns' is he thinks,
obviously verbal: both propositions 3ay precisely the same
thing, viz. that in some cases certain attributes 'go together'.
On the other hand, inference from experience to general proposi¬
tions is, Mill considers, obviously a 'real' inference: in
this instance, there is that movement from the known to the
previously unknown which Mill takes to be the sign of a genuinely
inferential process". (1968, p.20/21)
Thus Mill believes the traditional form of the syllogism, e.g.:
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All men are mortal
Socrates is a man
Therefore Socrates is mortal
to disguise the "real" inference contained in it. As Passraore puts it
this "real" inference is from the evidence on which our assertion about
all men is based to our conclusion about Socrates:
"This evidence, according to Mill, must consist of
particular observations: Smith is mortal, Brown is
mortal .... From our experience in these cases we
conclude that other men, Socrates for example, will
also die." (1968, p.22).
Whatever the merits of Mill's "particular to general" argument it
is certainly the case that the definition of "inference" has severely
taxed many philosophers if not many psychologists. For Bradley (1883)
and for James, an inference is the discovery of a relation. As Passmore
(1968) puts it:
"We consider the relation of A to B and of B to C; we
then construct an 'ideal group' which unites A, B, C
on the basis of some single principle. We note, for
example, that A=B and B=C; we then combine A, B, C into
a whole united by quantitative identity. In so doing
we perceive the relation between A and C." (1968, p.162)
Such an inference is of "not less than two terms into one con¬
struction" (Bradley, 1883). As Bradley also points out, however, there
are inferences in which there is no interposing term to link the extremes.
Immediate inference is, as Passmore suggests, a case in point. Either
such inferences are not true inferences at all, or they are (psycholo¬
gically speaking at least) "weaker" cases. Such a case for distinguishing
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them in a developmental context is as strong as it is for the logician.
For children as young as four may make immediate inferences: whether
they infer in any other sense is open to strong doubt.
Such doubt is sustained at every 3tage in the argument linking the
child's comprehension of relations to their ultimate co-ordination. For,
as the discussion of Chapter Three indicated, there is little or no direct
evidence that four year old children actually perceive relations per se.
Instead, it i3 possible that relations, as McGonigle and Jones (1977,b)
have suggested in the case of the squirrel monkey, merely determine the
phenomenal content of perceptual experience (in Koffka's terms (1935)
"why do things look as they do?"). For relations per se need not have,
as Kohler (1930) once pointed out, any psychological status even though
the determinants of what is actually perceived may be relational rather
than absolute in character. +
In so far as the above distinction is a valid one, it suggests that
the evidence for relational comprehension cannot be based solely on the
results of tests of transposition. For the judgment of what appears
equally "big", "bright", etc. - which is what much of transpositional
responding may entail - does not measure comprehension of the relation¬
ships between the stimuli. The "inner union" of Kohler's is not to be
confused with Bradley's "ideal group" I the determinants of appearance
with those of reason. 'Transposition' is thus, as McGonigle and Jones
(1977,b) point out.first and foremost a descriptive term used to describe
the behaviour of choosing, e.g. the selection of B over C when B has
previously been paired with A and all three are in an ascending (size)
Kohler argues that organisation is essentially what Kofflca (1935)
has termed a "silent affair" occurring somewhere between the retina
and the psychophysical field and "which are not normally experienced
in the sensory field" (Kohler, 1930, p. 166).
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series. What such behaviour implies is open, however, to serious question.
McGonigle and Jones interpret monkeys* transpositional behaviour as imply¬
ing nothing more (at least of this stage of inquiry) than the primacy of
relationally-based perception. The further question, whether relations
are actually perceived by the monkey, requires, they contend, a different
research paradigm. For, as these authors point out, the relationship
between the stimulus and response in conventional transpositional research
is a purely arbitrary one, where response categories used (pointing, object
displacement, etc.) have no necessary connection with the class of relation¬
ship^) existing amongst the stimuli. In other words such stimulus
relationships do not entail or prescribe any particular action (except
the "directionality" of the response which can be accounted for on other
grounds). This need not inevitably be the case, for the relation, e.g.
"larger than" has clear and actionable implications for such operations
as stacking, placing one object on top of another or inside the other,
etc. - an entailment which has previously been demonstrated in Kohler's
(1925) "insight" experiments where the field, once organised prescribes a
set of actions which are not arbitrary but a necessary development arising
out of what is perceived.
Language, of course, provides a further means to help determine
what relations, if any, are apprehended by the perceiver, especially in
the case of verification procedures - significantly lacking in the context
of transpositional research. Certainly the relational evidence which
Bryant (1973) U3e3 to justify his claim that young children use "relative
codes" does not extend to studies of verification. Instead, transposition
as a choice-behavioural phenomenon is used to imply relational awareness,
which the evidence, as it stands, does not justify.
It is perhaps significant that in both the cases of "transposition"
-Inl¬
and "transitivity" research the response set has been provided for the
subject by the experimenter. Thus "correctness" or "appropriateness"
criteria rather than those of response novelty apply here. And the
psychological cause of such behaviour must be inferred, in both cases,
from the direction of choices recorded, data which in themselves are
mute as to their psychological cause. Thus, eschewing the problem of
psychological causation, Bryant feels it necessary to invoke "memory"
as the significant developmental variable. His argument might thus be
paraphrased: Relative codes are primary, for "transposition" occurs
along several major dimensions of change, "transitivity" implies co¬
ordination of relations, for the choice profile obtained cannot readily
be explained on any other grounds. Therefore, given adequate retention,
the young child solves the five-term aeries by means of deductive mechanisms.
By contrast the thesis presented here suggests that the question of
"levels" remains one that must be tackled in both a comparative and a
developmental sphere. Rather than subscribe to the view that "memory" is
the significant variable which can be independently manipulated in develop¬
mental research, it is the view here that memory is a dependent effect
which reflects the complexity and depth of stimulus processing by the
subject. On this view, mere practice alone is insufficient to induce
competence where none can otherwise be demonstrated.
Comparative support for such a position has recently been provided
by KcGonigle and Jones (1975» 1977 a,b) and in a human context by e.g.
Craik and Lockhart (1972) and Sykes (1976): and it is worthy of note
here that>vone of the authors of the 1971 paper which provoked this thesis,
not-/ appears to espouse the same argument although apparently unaware of
his volte face. In 1974 (Lutkus and Trabasso) he alludes to Bryant and
Trabasso (1971) by saying:
"Bryant and Trabasso (1971) suggested that the failure
-11+2-
of normal children (four, five or six years of age)
to make transitive inferences is a production deficiency
due to memory factors rather than lack of logical reasoning
ability."
and yet he concludes another paper (Trabasso, Riley and Wilson, 1975)
with what appears to be the contradictory statement:
"This result is consistent with Craik and Lockhart's
(1972) depth of processing argument: the more elaborate
and longer lasting memory representation is that which
involved "deeper" processing."
Research, then, on the "depth" or levels of processing and the
representational structures which the organism generates to deal with
processing would now appear a promising and fecund domain of new inquiry.
"New", surprisingly, because, contrary to the impression which many
psychologists may have, almost nothing is known as Vurpillot (1976)
points out about the information processing capacities of children.
Guided, thep, by the mistakes of information-processing theorists of
the past and refreshed by a re-consideration of those criteria with
which to evaluate e.g. inferential behaviours which philosophers have
attempted to provide, the way seems open to an intensification of work
on the relationship between primary empirical experience and the elabora¬
tion of "objectification" - the conceptualisation of relationships which
transcend mere conjunction, distil the essential from the accidental,










As you may remember, we have been working with four year old
children using the paradigm which you first reported with Trabasso in
Nature 1971* Unfortunately some of the details of the apparatus and
procedure are not included in this or other publications which we have
read (Trabasso preprints, Bardies and 0'Began, etc.) and although it was
felt at the beginning of our investigations that the information we
lacked was unimportant, our subsequent failure to replicate your findings
makes it imperative that we carry out as near a replication of your
experiment as we can.
We should be most grateful, therefore, if you would inform us on
the following- points:
(1) The exact size of your box.
(2) The general procedure; in particular where it relates to the
transition from the training to the test phase. Was the same
(5 holes) box used during the test phase also? If a (fixed)
5 hole box was used, how did you counterbalance the position
of the rods?
(3) How consistently and with what age groups did you ask 'big-little'
as distinct from 'longer-shorter' questions?
(1+) Did you have a rejection criterion? If so, how many subjects
did you reject?
(5) Might we have more explicit details of your pre-training
procedure? E.g., did E determine at this point which Ss
did not understand 'longer-shorter' instructions, or was the
use of different instructions decided on an age basis only?
I believe you mentioned to Margaret Chalmers that it might be
possible to supply us with some of your training data. In particular
we would be interested in the proportions of subjects who are at chance
levels on B.D and those who are correct on all (2+) trials.
Any information which you could supply us with on these points
would be both welcome and interesting, particularly in the light of results
which Margaret has obtained recently. These indicate that:
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(a) Well over half of all subjects tested failed to complete
the experiment (12 subjects were successful out of 33)
using rejection criteria determined by whether (i) subjects
understood •longer-shorter1 instructions as measured by
performance over 6 successive trials on a pair of unpainted
sticks differing in length; (ii) not more than 20 trials per
pair during phase 1 training was allowed: (iii) not more than
200 trials training for all pairs involved in phase 2 testing
was permitted.
(b) The results also show that out of the 12 subjects who
successfully completed the training phases only 5 showed a
significant bias in the direction one could predict following
your own experiment.
Incidentally, I am testing monkeys on the colour-weight version of
the 5 term problem - I believe I mentioned this to you when at Oxford.
What do you expect? Sealed bids may be lodged not later than 30th Junej
I realise that our request may he somewhat taxing, but we are keen
to include in our study - particularly in the light of the results cited
above - a proper replication of your conditions.
With many thanks and best wishes,
- 145 -
APPENDIX B
"Short" versus "long" tray effects in Experiments 6 and 7 - Chapter Pour
During the course of Experiments 6 and 7 it was considered
necessary to use a spatial "aid" in the form of a "long" tray which
allowed adjacent -pairs to he spatially dissociated. While this
procedure did not appear to afford any obvious "cue", it did allow
five out of ten subjects in each group to complete training. A
question arose, therefore, concerning the extent to which this tray
provided a significant advantage for those subjects who used it in
training. As inspection of Tables 40 and 41 will reveal, the length
of the tray seems somehow to be implicated as a feature affecting
the test performance - for those subjects trained with the short
tray show a less transitive binary choice profile than those trained
with the long tray. Similarly, at least in the case of the Non-verbal
subjects, the triadic choice profiles are more strongly transitive
for those subjects trained with the "long tray". In the case of
the Verbal subjects, however, no such effects are apparent.























VERBAL GROUP C D E C D E
A . ON —J .80* A .51+ .78* .71+*




OVERALL BIAS *21 jJk
* Significantly above chance on a Binomial Test (p<0.0l)
- 146 -
TABLE 41 Triadic Choice -frofiles for "Short Tray" and "Long
Tray" Subjects
NON-VERBAL SHORT TRAY SUBJECTS LONG TRAY SUBJECTS
GROUP (N = 6) (H = 5)
ABC .07 .30 .63 .10 .27 .63
BCD .20 .20 .60 .20 .27 .63
CDE .10 .23 .67 .23 .07 .70
ABD .07 .60 .30 .13 .27 .60
BCE .03 .57 .1+0 .03 .37 .60
BDE .37 .17 .1+6 .20 .23 .67
AVERAGE
DISTRIBUTION .11+ • ?i+ .62 .16 .26 .60
VERBAL SHORT TRAY SUBJECTS LONG TRAY SUBJECTS
GROUP (N = 5) (H = 5)
— »
ABC .00 •1+7 .53 .11 .61 .28
BCD .19 .12 .69 • 26 .26 .1+7
CDE .00 .28 .72 .11 .17 .72
ABD .06 .61
r *23 .20 .1+7 .33
BCE .11 .22 .67 .25 .25 .60
BDE .10 .38 .52 .29 .29 .1+2
AVERAGE
DISTRIBUTION .07 . >ACO .20 • 31+ •I46
«- *-
ABC .66 .17 .17 .50 .38 .12
BCD .47 .37 .16 .69 .31 .00
CDE .62 .21+ .11+ .93 .07 .00
ABD .53 .26 .21 .67 .17 .16
BCE -1+7 .35 .18 .67 .33 .00
BDE .50 .31 .19 .35 .66 .00
AVERAGE
DISTRIBUTION |28 .18 »ol+ • 32 tQ4
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To explore the possibility farther, that the "tong tray" training
enhances test performance, "short tray" subjects were involved in a
re-teaining phase which occurred between Experiments 7 and 8.
HE-TRAIHIHG PHASE
Subjects from both groups who had been trained and tested on
the short tray were given 21+ training trials on the long tray as in
Phase V of the training procedure outlined in Experiment 6. If no
errors were recorded, they were given binary and triadic tests
exactly as the other long tray subjects had been given them,
RESULTS
All subjects showed perfect transfer on the first 21+ trials.
Tables 42 and 43 show the test performances before and after
re-training.
£*£& 42 binary Choice Profiles before and after re-training on
•the long tray
SHORT TRAY SUBJECTS SHORT TRAY SUBJECTS
AFTER RE-TRAINING ON
LONG TRAY
C D E C D E
NON-VERBAL
GROUP A .67 •1+7 .63 A .90 .57 .67
B .£1
*
























B .80* B .63, ,80*







TAp.LT: 43 Triadic Choice Profiles Before and After Re-training














BCD .20 .20 .60 .23 .23 •5U
CUE .10 .23 .67 .10 .13 .77
ABD .07 .60 .33 .00 .1+0 .60

















GROUP SHORT TRAY SUBJECTS SHORT TRAY SUBJECTS
AFTER RE-TRAINING ON
LONG TRAY
ABC .00 •U7 .53 .00 .1+1+ .56
BCD .19 .12 .69 .22 .28 .58
CDE .00 .28 .72 .06 .11 .83
ABD .06 .61 .33 .00 .65 .35














ABC .50 .38 .12 .69 .12 .19
BCD .69 .31 .00 .69 .25 .06
CDE .93 .07 .00 .65 .35 .00
ABD .67 .17 .16 .68 .16 .16


















The results partially confirm the suggestion that training
on the long tray produces an enhanced transitive effect. However,
this view is not supported ty the triadic data for the Verbal
subjects and the overall results are, thus, inconclusive. Lack
of time and direct relevance to the issue in hand prevented a
more rigorous exploration of the spatial effects.
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APPENDIX C
The Procedure arid. Results of Re-training the Aon-Verbal subjects on
the Verbal condition of Experiment 6 (Chapter Four)
RESTRAINING PROCEDURE
Subjects from the non-verbal group were given one session of
verbally administered training trials according to Phase V of the
procedure of Experiment 6 (Chapter Four). All (nine) subjects showed
perfect transfer and made no errors. Binary and Triadic tests were
then administered as for the verbal group of Experiment 6.
RESULTS
TABLE 44- The Binary Choice Profile of Verbal "Transfer" subjects.
B C D E




*Significantly above chance on a Binomial Test (p< 0.01)
A strong transitive bias is shown on all the test pairs except the
crucial one BD. Whilst this might suggest an overall lack of conserva¬
tion of response to BD from the non-verbal to the verbal situation, it
can be seen from the individual scores that this was not the case
(Table 45).
The triadic choice data indicates a strong positive "transfer" of
transitive responding, as can be seen from Table 46.
Table 47 3hows that there i3 greater concordance with the projections
from the binary model in the case where the direction specified by the
Son-verbal training procedure, i.e. A-> E.
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TABLE 45 Transitive Choices Frequencies on BP.










* - Subject who did not transfer his choice bias.









79 .64 .17 BCD .06 .29 .65
47 .33 .20 CDE .03 .34 .62
06 .04 .10 > ABD .03 .43 .54
57 .20 .23 BCE .09 •44 .47




BUTION .06 .34 .60
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TABLE 47 Deviations from Choice Projections for both Directions







ABC .03 .05 .02
BCD .11 .04 .15
CDE .03 .01 .05
ABD .03 .07 .04
BCS .09 .11 .20
BDE .04 .06 .03
AVERAGE











BCD .29 .31 .00
CDE .20 .00 .20
ABD .20 .13 .07
BCE .10 .13 .23
BDE .11 .05 .16
AVERAGE
DEVIATION •16 .12 .13
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DISCUSSION
The result* are consistent with the view that no particular
difficulty attaches to the verbal condition of test when a strong
non-verbal basis for discrimination exists. This view is reinforced
by the finding that experience with a particular "sensed" direction
of change in a non-verbal task can promote strong positive transfer
(measured here by concordance with the binary sampling model's triadic
"projections") to its corresponding verbally administered task.
Two further findings support the view that the nature of "sensed"
relationships is more critical to the performance on the verbal task than
the nature of the linguistic relations themselves. These are
(a) that no pure "lexical" effects (see Clark, 1969a) were apparent
in the training scores of the original verbal group. The total
errors across all phases of training for this &roup were 288
and 290 per Heavy and Light respectively.
(b) that one direction of stimulus was markedly more difficult than
the other. That B, subjects from whom A was heavy and E was
light took longer to learn the series than subjects for whom
A was light and E was heavy. Whilst seven out of the former sub¬
group of subjects required the long tray in training only 3 of
the latter group showed a need for this training "aid". As
can be seen from Table 48 furthermore, the error scores also
show an asymmetry between the group,
TABLE 48 Total Number of Srror3 During Acquisition.




verbal Group 431 337
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No "lexical" theory could readily explain such asymmetries. By
contrast, it can be noted that the sub-group differences are consistent
with the "feature positive" hypothesis of Jenkins (1967),
which states that a discrimination is more readily learned if the
positive stimulus has a physically distinctive feature. If, in the
above case, the "positive" stimulus is the "next" or novel one, and the
"feature-full" stimulus i3 taken to be the heavy one (this stimulus
had sand in it and "rattled" a good deal), then it can be seen that
the direction of asymmetry is in accord with the feature positive
hypothesis. Further support for this comes from the acquisition scores
for the verbal group for whom, direct relationship was observed between
the series direction and performance on the "positive" stimulus (despite
the overall difference across the two series directions). That is,
those (five) subjects for whom the "novel" stimulus was always heavy,
made more errors on light tlmn on heavy, while those (five) subjects
for whom the opposite was the case, made more errors on heavy than on
light. The difference between these sub-groups was significant
p
(x^ sig. at p <.0,02, d.f = 1).
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Tabic 2 Concentration of unsaturated acids
Percentage of Concentration Percentage of Concentration
Acid total (pg per lOOg Acid total (pg per 100 g
acids* sediment) acids sediment)
12: It 0.12 1.55 17: 2t 0.28 3.64
14: Io)7 0.24 3.26 18: 2(i)6 1.34 18.0
14: 1 co5 0.12 1.54 16: 3o)4§ 1.28 17.1
15: 1 o)8 0.30 3.97 18: 30)3 0.45 6.03
15: 1 co6 0.42 5.56 18: 30)6 0.86 11.6
iso 15: 1 0.11 1.51 20: 3o)6 0.43 5.76
anteiso 15: 1 0.04 0.48 18: 4co3 0.76 10.1
16: 1 co7 29.2 390 20: 4 o)6 8.39 112
16: 1 io5 0.55 7.36 22: 40)6 0.25 3.37
iso 16:1 + 0.06 0.83 20: 50)3 7.30 97.8
17: 1 co8 2.14 28.7 22: 5o)3 0.12 1.66
17: 1 to6 0.45 6.02
iso 17: It 0.25 3.29 tl6: 10)7 0.27 3.56
anteiso 17: 1 0.09 1.17 116: 1 o)13 0.47 6.32
18: 1 0)9 1.88 25.2 118:1 o>7 0.14 1.89
18: 1 0)7 3.30 < 44.2 118: 1 o)9 0.11 1.51
16: 2o)4 1.26 16.9
16: 2co7 0.87 11.6
* Data quoted to two decimals is only used to indicate the ratio of minor components. Actual accuracy is about 15% and the values are correc¬
ted for the slight loss of unsaturated acids on the capillary columns, t Two unidentified isomers, t Mainly A'. § Trace 0)3 and o>6 isomers.
in each case were trans. In our sediment the percentage of
the cis isomer is larger (99% for 16:1, 95-% for 18 : 1) and
the proportion of cis and trans for each positional 16 : I
and 18:1 isomer varies significantly. The range of trans
acids in the sediment seems to parallel the range of the
corresponding cis isomers but the very low concentrations
encountered here have prevented us from obtaining
unequivocal identifications. These acids and the change of
the cis-trans ratio with depth are under study. The other
trans isomer isolated, 116 : loil3, is probably of biological
origin. This acid has not previously been reported from a
sediment, despite its ubiquity in photosynthetic organisms
where it is found localised in the chloroplast phosphatidyl
glycerol fraction". This acid may prove to be a good marker
for a contribution from photosynthetic organisms.
This report shows that a detailed study of the gross fatty
acid patterns can be combined with the isomeric forms of
these acids to be of value to the-environmentalist in relating
isolates to probable origin. In our case diatoms and marine
bacteria are strongly implicated as the major contributors
of organic carbon to this typical, temperate intertidal zone
sediment.
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Are monkeys logical?
The monkey's status as a thinker has never been high;
yet laboratory investigations testify, nevertheless, to the
ability of many species of monkey to learn complex tasks,
if not to reason. On this latter point, however, hard
evidence is significantly lacking. One reason for this
is that it is difficult to devise tests which are both
meaningful to non-verbal subjects yet satisfy the stringent
requirements of a formal reasoning test such as one adapted
from Burt1 which first gives the subject the following
information: "Edith is fairer than Suzanne", "Edith is
darker than Lili", and then requires solution of the
question, "which is the darkest, Edith, Suzanne or Lili?".
Bryant and Trabasso1 have devised a simplified method
of giving such tests to very young children, and we have
adapted this into a non-verbal one for use with monkeys.
In Bryant and Trabasso's study, children were first
trained to label five rods presented in four subsets as big
or small according to the colour and the subsets in which
they were embedded. As displayed, however, no size
differences were apparent. Thus, for example, a yellow rod
(A) was taught as 'taller than' a red one (B), a red one
as 'taller than' a blue one (C), a blue rod was learnt as
'taller than' a green one (D), and a green one as 'taller
than' a white one (E). On subsequent tests, children were
asked to judge the relative sizes of non-adjacent members
of the set, for example red (B) against green (D).
Eight adult squirrel monkeys were tested in an apparatus
(a Visconsin General Testing Apparatus) which allowed the
monkey to view on any one trial, a tray bearing two
cylindrical tin containers of equal size but differing in
colour and weight. The experimental design is depicted in
Table 1. Each monkey was confronted with four pairs of
colour discriminations, learnt serially. For half the subjects
the rewarded stimulus was heavier than the non-rewarded
one; for the other half it was the lighter one. Weight
differences were used to emphasise stimulus differences in
the course of preliminary training'. Only two weight values
were used throughout the experiment, however; the 'heavy'
tin in any pair was filled with lead shot, the 'light' one
was empty. Thus, no specific weight could be uniquely
identified with stimuli B, C and D.
Monkeys were assigned to different colour pairings and
the tray colour was also varied from monkey to monkey
in an attempt to eliminate fortuitous colour preferences
which might affect the crucial test choices. Each pair was
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Table 1 Scheme of training paradigm
Series identification D D
Pair























learnt in serial order from AB to DE to a criterion of
18/20 trials correct for each pair. Choice of one of the
tins was rewarded with a peanut located in one of two
foodwells directly underneath the stimuli. To indicate
choice and secure the reward, the monkey had to manually
displace the appropriate tin from its position over the
foodwell. After an error, however, the monkey received
no reward; the tray was withdrawn in full view of the
subject for 5 s, and a screen was then lowered to permit
the experimenter to replace the stimulus unseen and restart
testing. The respective positions of the stimuli varied from
the left to the right of the tray according to a random
sequence.
When subjects had learnt all four pairs they were given
a second run through all problems in the same order to
the same performance criterion. Several subsequent runs
then followed in which the number of training trials given
per problem was progressively reduced. Finally, five runs
were given of one trial per problem in a random order
of presentation. A maximum of 50 trials per day was
administered. When each monkey had progressed through
all stages of the procedure outlined above, it was given a
series of 10 critical trials on the B against D comparison
(see Table 1). 'Critical' tests, however, were not administered
in any session until the animal first recorded a performance
of 22/24 correct in the course of 24 successive encounters
of training pairs in a random sequence; not more than two
transitive tests were administered per session. All choices
were rewarded irrespective of bias during the testing phase.
When the B against D tests were complete, subjects were
given further tests in similar conditions with the AC,
AD, AE, CE and BE combinations in counterbalanced
order of presentation (these are regarded as less critical as
they include stimuli A and E which can be identified as
having been invariably rewarded (E) or invariably non-
rewarded (A)). All but one monkey learnt the series; the
eighth was erratic and did not meet our stringent training
criteria sufficiently often to warrant subsequent testing.
In Table 2 the monkey results are compared with the
child data obtained by Bryant and Trabasso for 4-yr-old
children. These data clearly show a choice profile consistent
with the notion that monkey choices are transitive and
accord in virtually every detail with the data reported for
children.
Are we to assume, therefore, that monkeys solve such
problems by means of deductive inference? Certainly the
evidence is consistent with the idea that in order to solve
such problems, subjects must coordinate two vital pieces
of information—for example that C is heavier than B, and
that D is heavier than C. There are alternative ways in
which the problem might be solved, however. Among
these', the one which is perhaps the most radically at odds
with the coordination model1 assumes that transitive choices
result from single binary decision making.
A set BCD, for example, affords three subsets, BC, CD
and BD. If a decision is based exclusively on the interro¬
gation of any one subset, and if we assume (in the absence
of information to the contrary) that each subset is interro¬
gated equally often, then it is possible to compute the
choice proportions to each of the constituent members of
the triad BCD on a given trial. If, therefore, the probability
of selecting any one of the subsets as a basis for choice
is 0.33 (approximately) we can thus predict an overall
choice proportion of 0.33 in the case of C (assuming
absolute preference for C over B). D has two reference
subsets, CD and BD. In the case of subset CD (making the
same assumptions as above) the choice proportion pre¬
dicted for D will be approximately 33%. In the case of
subset BD, however, we need assume no consistent pre¬
ference for either B or D. On the 33% of all occasions
on which these comparisons are made, the subject may
select either one equally often. In this case, the overall
probability of choosing D would rise by a further 16%
(with roughly 16% of all choices going to B). Thus we
might predict the approximate choice proportions for all
three stimuli in the set BCD as follows: B = 0.17, C = 0.33
and D = <3.50.
In a two-choice situation, of course, where B is presented
in conjunction with D, C would have to be 'inferred' as
a referent (an assumption in common with the coordination
model, some theories of perception1, and of transitivity*
and a reasonable one given the duplicate relationship of
C with B and D). In this instance the choice proportions
attributable to C when actually present will now add to
the overall proportions for D (as half of them will rule
out responses to B, the other half will confirm D directly).
Thus the probability values for BD in a two-choice situation
will now be: B = 0.17, D = 0.83.
In the case of comparisons involving an endpoint value,
however, (either A or E), fewer subsets will be at chance
levels of choice (taking as a total population all 10 triadic
permutations of the 5 term series A, B, C, D and E);
thiis the projection for the average transitive choice pro¬
portion is 0.98. Such predictions seem a remarkably close
fit to data already obtained in various experiments reported
to date (Table 3).
Apart from fitting predictions to existing data, however,
to provide an alternative account to the coordination
model, there is an empirical test of the relative strengths
of these opposed accounts which is made possible if three
Tabic 2 Transitive choice data for squirrel monkeys compared with the profile reported by Bryant and Trabasso" for 4-yr-old children.
Monkeys 4-yr-old children (B +T)
(Experiment 1)
DB C D E B C E
A 0.98 1.00 LOO 1.00 A 0.96 0.96 0.93 0.98
B — 0.93 0.90 0.76 B — 0.92 0.78 0.92
C 0.89 0.87 C — — 0.90 0.94
D — — — 0.97 D — — 0.91
All choices reported for monkeys are significant on a binomial test (pcO.OOl). Note especially the B against D comparisons which cannot
depend directly on 'end-anchoring' effects.
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Table 3 Averaged transitive choice data taken from three separate investigations (choice proportions)
Investigation Choice proportions to Proportions to the Overall transitive
pairs with end points 'critical' pair (BD) choice proportion
Bryant and Trabasso"
experiments 1 and 2 (5 groups)
dc Boysson-Bardies and O'Regan1
0.96 (0.98) 0.85 (0.83) 0.94 (0.96)
experiments 1 and 2 (2 groups) 0.91 (0.98) 0.82 (0.83) 0.90 (0.96)
This work (1 group) 0.93 (0.98) 0.90 (0.83) 0.92 (0.96)
Average (all investigations) 0.95 (0.98) 0.85 (0.83) 0.93 (0.96)
Values in parentheses are predicted values from a binary choice model (basis of computation outlined in Table 4).
(or more) stimuli, for example B-t-C+D, are actually
presented to the subject for choice following establishment
of strong preferences within subsets BC and CD. On the
coordination model it is not readily apparent why the
actual presentation of the three relevant terms would do
other than emphasise further the choice bias in favour of
D obtained in the course of two-choice transitivity tests
(for example BD). On the binary sampling model, however,
a 'reduced' transitive effect is demanded whereas no such
predictions are afforded by the coordination theory. We
report below a direct test of these positions.
The seven remaining monkeys were presented with 10
triplets derived from all possible triadic combinations of
the five stimuli in the original set (A, B, C, D and E).
Each session began with 25 trials involving the original
training pairs presented in random order. If not more than
two errors were recorded, monkeys were then confronted
with a three-choice situation where, for another 25 trials
per session, each of the 10 triplets was presented in a
counterbalanced order. The position of each stimulus on the
tray was also counterbalanced. The stimuli were either all
'heavy' or 'light' in accordance with the previous training
history of the animal. All choices were rewarded, and the
experiment was terminated when subjects made 10 separate
choices to each of the 10 triplets presented for test.
Table 4 Profile of choice following triadic presentations
Triads Choice projection* Obtained
ABC 00 33 67 00 31 69
BCD 17 33 50 03 36 61
BDE 17 17 67 16 24 60
CDE 00 33 67 11 24 65
BCE 00 33 67 06 28 66
ABD 00 50 50 00 44 56
ACD 00 33 67 00 30 70
ADE 00 33 67 01 21 78
ABE 00 33 67 00 30 70
ACE 00 33 67 00 26 74
Average
distribution 0.03 0.33 0.64 0.04 0.29 0.67
The figures in the left-hand column are predictions based on the
assumptions that the subsets are sampled equally often and that
preferences are absolute within those subsets presented during
original training.
•Basis for predictions in Table 3.
Table 4 shows the overall choice profile in these
conditions, and shows how the response distributions for
triads are well predicted from a binary (statistical) decision
model. By contrast, a coordination model1 does not readily
lend itself to any quantifiable prediction of a reduced
transitive effect. On the contrary, with the relevant choice
items in the immediate perceptual field, the 'transitive'
choices should, if anything, be all the more pronounced.
Whatever the case for, or against, deductive reasoning
which may be fashioned from results such as those reported
here, it is clear that some kind of 'inference' necessary
to produce the appropriate 'inferred' set or absent referent
is used by monkey in tests of transitivity such as those
described here. Whether such operations (of 'inference')
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Dissolved ATP in the sea
and its utilisation by marine bacteria
The biologically labile fraction of the dissolved organic
matter (DOM) in the oceans seems to be a chemically
complex solution of a wide variety of compounds derived
mainly from the contents of cellular metabolic pools
released into the seawater after the death and cell lysis of
marine organisms. This fraction is of particular geochemical
interest because of its importance in understanding the
cycling of organic matter in the marine environment.
Because of methodological problems arising from the
extremely low concentrations of individual compounds,
compound-specific analyses have been limited to only a
few components of the DOM, such as amino acids',
lipids1, sugars1, and vitamins1. Adenosine-5'-triphosphate
(ATP) would be a useful tracer for following the production
and fate of labile DOM in seawater as it is a universal
component of the cellular metabolic pools of all living
organisms. We report here that dissolved ATP (DATP)
occurs in seawater in significant concentrations (0.1-
0.6 ^g r1) and is utilised rapidly by marine bacteria.
Although the particulate ATP content of marine seston
(suspended particles) has been used extensively as a
sensitive indicator of microbial biomass in oceans and
lakes', the presence of DATP in seawater had not been
demonstrated conclusively'. This has been due, in part, to
the absence of a suitably sensitive method, and, in part, to
the general assumption that ATP is so rapidly degraded
by transphosphorylases and ATPases after cell death as to
preclude its presence in the DOM. We considered that the
rate of enzymatic breakdown of DATP in the sea might
be negligible because extreme dilution of both the enzymes
and the substrate occurs after cell disruption.
DATP concentrations in coastal waters of Southern
California and British Columbia, Canada were measured
using a modification of the method of Hodson et al.', which
was developed originally for determination of ATP asso¬
ciated with organisms in marine sediments. Seawater
samples (50 or 100 ml) were first filtered through 0.2 am
Nuclepore filters to remove ATP associated with organisms
and other particles. Filtrates were acidified to 0.6 N with
sulphuric acid. A trace amount of -/-"P-ATP (less than
1 nCi per sample; 700 Ci mmol"') was added as an internal
standard and the sample was passed through a column of
activated charcoal. Adsorbed ATP was then eluted with
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